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Most of us believe that induction and perception have some normative status that counter-
induction and crystal gazing lack: the former are correct, but the latter are not.  How are such 
beliefs about rationality justified?  My dissertation examines two skeptical arguments that 
contend the answer is: they’re not.   
The first skeptical worry centers on circularity.  The only defense I can give for the claim 
that induction will mostly lead me to true beliefs will invoke induction – it will point out that 
induction has been reliable in the past and thus conclude (via inductive inference) that induction 
will be reliable in the future.  Much the same applies to perception: I can give a story about why 
I expect it to be reliable, but only by citing perceptual beliefs.  These defenses seem worryingly 
circular.   
Non-skeptical responses to this puzzle fall into two camps: Mooreans embrace the 
circular defenses of perception and induction; rationalists say that justification to believe that 
perception and induction are reliable is apriori.  I defend Moorean responses to skepticism: the 
most plausible accounts of why the aforementioned reasoning is viciously circular fail.  In 
addition, I argue that rationalism—while perhaps true—is insufficient to deflect the skeptical 
worry.  It turns out that even rationalists need to embrace Moorean circular reasoning.   
The second skeptical worry focuses on the etiology of our faculties of reason.  There is 
some causal story about why I am inclined to engage in certain patterns of normative reasoning: 
roughly, evolution by natural selection.  Selection pressures favored norms that helped our 
ancestors find food and show off to potential mates.  A puzzle arises because correctness does 
not appear well-positioned to provide an adaptive edge.  The correct ways of reasoning about 
normative matters might have aided survival, but only as a fortuitous side effect - so getting it 
right would be a fluke.   
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I show that this puzzle yields a serious skeptical worry.  We ought to doubt that we are 
trustworthy normative reasoners unless there is an explanatory connection between the 
normative facts and our faculties for normative reasoning.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: HOW CAN I KNOW WHETHER I AM REASONING 
CORRECTLY? 
People can and do form beliefs in myriad ways: induction, gazing into crystal balls, perception, 
consulting sacred texts, and so on.  In addition to this actual diversity, we can imagine possible 
thinkers who employ still more exotic approaches: counter-induction, inference to the funniest 
explanation, or whatever.  Not all epistemic differences are so startling: among practitioners of 
induction, some embrace more liberal versions of induction (becoming confident that observed 
patterns will continue based on relatively little evidence) whereas others are more conservative 
(remaining agnostic about the future until the evidence of a pattern is overwhelming).  We 
ordinarily think that some of these ways of conforming one’s beliefs to the evidence are correct 
whereas others are not.  When we condemn the pathological rules, our thought isn’t just that we 
think such rules are practically ill-advised, as when we condemn someone for (say) not saving 
any money.  Rather, we think they involve going wrong about what is evidence for what: we 
think that other people are following the wrong evidential norms.   
What separates the correct evidential norms from the incorrect ones?  In some cases, the 
answer is easy.  I have good inductive justification to believe that The New York Times is pretty 
reliable and that Weekly World News is quite unreliable, so the norm of believing what I read in 
the Times is correct while the norm of believing what I read in the Weekly World News is not.  
However, we can’t account for the correctness of every norm in this way.  At least some norms 
must be basic, where N is a basic norm just in case it is appropriate for me to reason in 
accordance with N absent a belief justified by another norm that reasoning in accord with N is 
reliable.  So the really difficult challenge is to say what separates the correct basic evidential 
norms from the incorrect ones.  We can separate this puzzle into two questions: first, what 
separates the correct basic evidential norms from the pathological ones?  Second, why is it 
reasonable for me to believe that my basic evidential norms are correct? 
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A tempting answer to the second question is: it isn’t.  The answer is tempting because of 
two skeptical arguments that purport to show that it is unreasonable to believe that your 
evidential norms are correct.  These arguments allege that our beliefs about evidential norms are 
no better than blind stabs in the dark.   
Setting out and responding to these two skeptical arguments will be the main task of this 
dissertation.  Here I will give a brief sketch of the skeptical arguments and of the overall shape of 
my reply.  Setting out these problems with care takes some work, though, so what I say here will 
necessarily be rough – for the best statements of the skeptical problems, see later chapters.  My 
focus will be on the question of how it could be rational to believe that my norms are the correct 
ones, but, as we will see, this requires making some claims about just what kind of property 
correctness is.   
 
1.1 FIRST WORRY: CIRCULARITY 
 
Suppose someone asked you to give a defense of induction; to explain why you think it 
reasonable to believe the future will resemble the past.  It’s a familiar point that the best we can 
offer is a circular reply: pointing out that, in the past, the future has always resembled the past 
and thus concluding (via inductive inference) that in the future, the future will resemble the past.  
Much the same applies to perception: if pressed on why you trust your perceptual beliefs, you 
can give a reply – but that reply will have to invoke beliefs based on perception.  These replies 
look viciously circular.  If they are, we are left without any means of justifying our beliefs that 
perception and induction are better routes to the truth than just picking claims to believe out of a 
hat.  We can state the argument for inductive skepticism a bit more carefully  
Premise: Any justification I have to believe that the future will resemble the past must 
depend (at least in part) on induction 
Premise: I can form justified beliefs using induction only if I already have justification 
to believe that the future will resemble the past 
So: I do not have justification to believe that the future will resemble the past 
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We can generalize this form to yield a skeptical argument concerning any basic evidential 
norm N: 
 
Premise: Any justification I have to believe that N is reliable must come from 
reasoning in accord with N 
Premise: I can form justified beliefs using N only if I already have justification to 
believe that reasoning in accord with N is reliable 
So: I do not have justification to believe that reasoning in accord with N is reliable 
 
Since N is basic, the first premise looks true – if reasoning in accord with N were appropriate 
because of a belief that reasoning in accord with N is reliable justified by some other norm N’ 
then, by definition, N would not be basic.  The second premise looks like a plausible anti-
circularity constraint. But the conclusion—that none of us is justified in counting his basic 
evidential norms as any better than guessing—is devastating.  How can we reply? 
One strategy for reply is rationalism: rejecting the first premise of each argument on the 
grounds that I have apriori justification to believe my basic norms are reliable (including, e.g. 
apriori justification to believe that the future will resemble the past).  A second strategy is 
Mooreanism: rejecting the second premise of each argument and saying that I can, for instance, 
acquire a justified belief that the future will resemble the past for the first time using induction 
(this position gets its name from G. E. Moore’s infamous “proof” of an external world).  
Moorean inferences look viciously circular, though, so we seem stuck with two unappealing 
options: embracing implausible apriori justification or condoning some fishy-looking circular 
reasoning.   
 
1.2 WHAT I WILL SAY ABOUT THE FIRST WORRY 
 
 
I agree that Moorean responses to skepticism look fishy, but I will defend them nonetheless.  
One way to defend Mooreanism—a strategy that I will not adopt—is to say that it is less bad 
than skepticism or rationalism; since we are forced to choose, we ought to hold our noses and 
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become Mooreans.  Perhaps this line of reasoning is compelling, but fortunately matters are not 
so bleak.  There is no good reason to condemn Moorean responses to skepticism.  I will begin 
my defense of Mooreanism with a question: what, exactly, is circular about Moorean responses 
to skepticism?  After all, Moore’s “proof” and the inductive defense of induction do not have 
conclusions that appear among their premises.  The standard account of what is wrong with 
Moorean reasoning is that it violates a principle called conservatism: the claim that someone 
can form justified beliefs via some reasoning only if he already has justification to believe that 
all skeptical underminers for that reasoning are false.  
Most fans of Mooreanism reject conservatism.  I don’t.  Instead, I argue that 
conservatism is ambiguous because it employs the ambiguous notion of justification to believe.  
Philosophers normally understand S has justification to believe that p in two ways: 
 
1. S has adequate evidence that bears on whether p 
 
2. There is a sound, undefeated route of reasoning from S’s evidence to the conclusion 
that p   
 
These two understandings are not equivalent.  They come apart quite dramatically in cases where 
S has lots of evidence in favor of p but also has lots of evidence that he cannot figure out 
whether p on the basis of his evidence: in such cases S has justification to believe that p in the 
first but not the second sense.  The two understandings of justification to believe that p come 
apart because someone can reasonably conclude that p only when two kinds of evidence are in 
order: evidence that p (call this object-directed evidence) and evidence that he can figure out 
whether p (call this reasoning-directed evidence).  It is ambiguous whether conservatism uses 
the term justification to believe in a strong sense that requires having both kinds of evidence in 
order or a weak one that requires only the first kind of evidence.  In chapter 1 I argue that 
plugging either the stronger or weaker of these two senses of justification to believe into 
conservatism yields a claim that does not make trouble for Moorean responses to skepticism.  If 
we plug the stronger sense in, conservatism is false – it badly misfires in humdrum cases.  If we 
plug the weaker sense in, conservatism may well be true, but it doesn’t condemn Moorean 
responses to skepticism.  Either way, Mooreans are out of the woods.   
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What about the rationalist anti-skeptical strategy?  In chapter 2, I will lay out a new 
challenge for fans of rationalist responses to skepticism.  A common worry about rationalism is 
that it is mysterious or implausible – it’s not totally obvious where all of this apriori justification 
is supposed to come from.  I’ll set that worry aside.  Instead, I’ll focus on the worry that 
rationalist responses to skepticism end up embracing the same kinds of circular reasoning as 
Moorean ones.  In particular, I will focus on a skeptical scenario tailor-made to cause trouble for 
rationalism: 
 
 
I am a recently envatted brain and a neuroscientist is manipulating my faculties of 
reason in ways that make it seem to me that I have apriori justification to believe 
false, deeply contingent propositions for which I do not, in fact, have apriori 
justification. 
 
 
If a rationalist responds to this scenario by saying “it’s just apriori that I’m not in that kind of 
situation” he seems to be begging the question against skeptics in just the same way that 
Mooreans do.  In chapter 2, I argue that this appearance is correct: there is no plausible anti-
circularity constraint that rules out Moorean reasoning but does not rule out the rationalist reply 
to the above skeptical hypothesis.  As a result, rationalists and Mooreans are on all fours when it 
comes to making circular arguments.  Does that mean rationalism is false?  No.  But it does mean 
that worries about circularity provide no reason to prefer rationalist responses to skepticism over 
Moorean ones.  And this, in turn, entails the surprising result that the truth of rationalism—
apriori justification to believe that induction and perception and so on are reliable—isn’t, by 
itself, an adequate response to skepticism about epistemic rationality.  If circular arguments (in 
the sense in which Moorean arguments are circular) are no good, skeptics win even if rationalism 
is true.  If circular arguments are fine, Moorean responses to skepticism are adequate.  All that 
apriori justification doesn’t make the need to embrace Moorean reasoning any less pressing.   
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1.3 SECOND WORRY: THE ETIOLOGY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS 
 
 
There is some causal story about why I embrace the evidential norms that I do: roughly, 
evolution by natural selection. Consider non-naturalistic realism about norms: the view that our 
attitudes do not explain why some epistemic norms are correct (that’s realism) and correctness is 
not identical to any natural properties (that’s non-naturalism).  Non-naturalistic realists face a 
puzzle about why anyone should think that her norms are correct.  Selection pressures favored 
norms that helped our ancestors find food and show off to potential mates.  A puzzle arises 
because correctness—if it’s a non-natural property of norms—provides no adaptive edge.  The 
correct ways of reasoning about normative matters might have aided survival, but only as a 
fortuitous side effect.  As a result, getting it right would be a fluke.  That seems a compelling 
reason to doubt that I am getting it right.  I ought to think that, unless I’ve fortuitously stumbled 
upon a winning ticket in the normative lottery, my evidential norms are not the correct ones.   
1.4 WHAT I WILL SAY ABOUT THE SECOND WORRY 
 
The second worry—rooted in the etiology of our faculties of judgment—is serious.  Many 
standard anti-skeptical strategies (in particular, Mooreanism and rationalism) cannot deflect it.  
The only way to avoid skepticism is to reject the assumption that gets the skeptical worry off the 
ground.  We ought to trust our normative judgments only if there is some explanatory connection 
between the normative facts and our faculties of normative judgment: our faculties must explain 
why the norms are what they are or the norms must explain why our faculties are what they are.  
Non-naturalistic realism does not allow either direction of explanation—the problem isn’t that 
non-natural facts are causally inert, but rather that even on views wherein they have causal 
powers they aren’t well positioned to explain why I reason in accord with one norm rather than 
another—so it leads to skepticism.   
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Three notes about this skeptical strategy: first, though naturalists and constructivists/anti-
realists (people who think our proclivities to make certain judgments explain why the normative 
facts are what they are) can resist this skeptical attack, they can do so only by embracing a kind 
of Moorean inference.  So Mooreanism isn’t sufficient to block this skeptical worry, but it is 
necessary.   Second, nothing in the skeptical argument turns on the details of evolution by natural 
selection.  The attack is utterly apriori.  It turns on two apparently innocuous claims about 
evidential support: 
1. It is rational to believe the best explanation of your evidence 
2. If [someone can form a justified belief that p on the basis of process R] then [the 
output of R is evidence that p] 
 
Third, the skeptical worry threatens to generalize to beliefs about any domain wherein there is no 
explanatory connection between the facts in that domain, on the one hand, and our beliefs about 
the domain, on the other.  Our beliefs about logic, mathematics, and metaphysics all appear to 
fall within this category.  Though I do not pursue these extensions of this skeptical worry in what 
follows, they mean that the stakes in understanding this skeptical mode are high indeed.   
 
1.5 WHAT ALL OF THIS, TAKEN TOGETHER, SHOWS 
 
 
The need to respond to the first skeptical attack does not put any constraints on the nature of 
correctness, but does require that we embrace Moorean reasoning.  That’s not bad news, though, 
since the standard case against Moorean reasoning is no good.  The second attack does require us 
to adopt a certain story about the nature of correctness, on pain of thoroughgoing normative 
skepticism: there must be an explanatory connection between our normative judgments and the 
normative facts.  It also requires us to embrace Moorean reasoning.  Moreover, rationalism—
whatever its merits—is insufficient to deflect either skeptical attack.   
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Before commencing our argument in detail, though, a note on the argumentative strategy 
of all three chapters contained herein: each discussion of skepticism will, at a key juncture, 
invoke reasoning-directed defeat.  That is, a skeptical move will involve attacking justification to 
believe that p not by producing evidence that not-p, or by undermining one’s evidence for p, but 
rather by giving reason to doubt that you can figure out whether p.  A number of writers have, of 
late, begun to emphasize the hitherto ignored topic of reasoning-directed evidence (often 
called—misleadingly—“higher-order evidence”): it figures prominently in recent discussions of 
the epistemic significance of disagreement and the shortcomings of Bayesianism as a guide to 
rational belief.  One upshot of this dissertation is that these recent discussions reveal just the tip 
of an iceberg: reasoning-directed defeat is at the heart of many, perhaps even all, modes of 
skeptical attack.  The relative dearth of literature on reasoning-directed evidence is thus no small 
oversight.  In what follows I will offer some guidance about the rational significance of 
reasoning-directed evidence.  Mostly, though, this dissertation serves to show that puzzles about 
reasoning-directed evidence are central to epistemology.  Questions about how to respond to 
evidence of our own cognitive limitations lie at the heart of some of the deepest and most 
pressing skeptical worries. 
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2.0  MOOREAN RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM: A DEFENSE 
 
 
Many philosophers believe that it is hard, or even impossible, to show that some notorious 
skeptical hypotheses are false.  But according to many followers of G. E. Moore, refuting these 
skeptical hypotheses is very easy.  Consider: 
 
Enabling condition1: (Moore-1) [an experience as of a hand] 
So: (Moore-2) I have a hand 
Therefore: (Moore-3) I am not a handless brain in a vat 
 
Premise: (Induction-1) In the past, observed regularities have tended to continue 
into the future 
So: (Induction-2) From now on, observed regularities will tend to continue into 
the future 
Therefore: (Induction-3) Induction will continue to be reliable in the future 
 
Can we stop worrying about these skeptical hypotheses? 
Few of us think it’s so easy.  These bits of Moore-inspired reasoning look fishy indeed.  It turns 
out to be difficult, however, to say just what is wrong with them.  None of the above bits of 
reasoning is tautological: their conclusions do not appear among their premises.  Denying the 
premise Induction-1, or denying that we are ever in the enabling condition Moore-1, is totally 
implausible.  Moreover, in each case the premise or enabling condition rationally supports an 
intermediate result, and the intermediate result entails the conclusion.  Of course, someone could 
generate a problem for these arguments by denying that we are entitled to believe the 
                                                
1 I say “enabling condition” rather than “premise” since having some perceptual experience cannot itself be a 
premise in an argument (though, of course, the proposition I am having a perceptual experience as of a hand could 
be).  By enabling condition I simply mean a state that licenses the formation of another belief, here via the use of 
perception.   
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intermediate result—for instance, that I have a hand—but that seems like an awfully drastic 
measure.  We would like a diagnosis of what is fishy about these arguments that does not commit 
us to skepticism about the existence of nearby mid-sized objects.  Finally, we could generate a 
problem for these arguments by denying closure—the thesis that if someone has justification to 
believe that p, and p entails q, and he forms a belief that q based on p, then his belief that q must 
be justified—and then denying that anyone who has justification to believe the intermediate 
result of each argument must have justification to believe the conclusion.  But denying closure is 
a radical step indeed.2  So far none of the possible diagnoses of what’s wrong with these 
arguments looks remotely appealing.  Can’t we do better?  
Yes.  A better diagnosis rests on the observation that in both cases the conclusion of the 
bit of reasoning negates a skeptical hypothesis that removes the support lent by the premises or 
enabling condition to the intermediate result.  For instance, the negation of Moore-3 removes the 
support lent by a perceptual experience as of a hand for the proposition I have a hand.  The 
plausible diagnosis rests on a principle called conservatism: roughly, the claim that someone can 
acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he already has justification to believe that 
all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the support lent by E to p are false.  Conservatives 
say that the problem with each of the above bits of reasoning is that nobody can ever use them to 
acquire justification to believe their conclusions.  Why not?  Well, someone can acquire 
justification to believe Induction-2 on the basis of Induction-1 only if she already has 
justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that remove support for inductive 
inferences—including the negation of Induction-3—are false.  So someone is in a position to 
perform the reasoning described in Induction 1-3 only if she already has justification to believe 
Induction-3.  The same diagnosis applies to Moore 1-3.  So these bits of reasoning—while not 
tautological—are epistemically useless.  Nobody can use them to acquire justification to believe 
anything new.3  
Part of the appeal of the conservative diagnosis is that in everyday cases—as opposed to 
cases involving notorious skeptical hypothesis—Moorean reasoning looks obviously futile.  
Consider: 
                                                
2 Any adequate argument in favor of closure would take us far from the main thrust of this paper.  For a full defense 
of closure, see Hawthorne.   
3 The original statement of this diagnosis is Wright (1985); further refinements appear in later Wright papers, as well 
as White.     
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Premise: (Table-1) This table looks red 
So: (Table-2) This table is red 
Therefore: (Table-3) This is not a white table under red lights 
 
 
Premise: (Election-1) Someone just checked a box on a piece of paper and slid it into a 
slot 
So: (Election-2) Someone just voted 
Therefore: (Election-3) An election is happening, rather than a rehearsal 
 
These look like terrible bits of reasoning.  It should not be so easy to acquire justified beliefs in 
Table-3 or Election-3; if these arguments are not epistemically useless they generate odious 
“easy justification” for their conclusions.4  Yet, as before, it can be tricky to say what is wrong 
with each bit of reasoning: neither is tautological, and each step looks individually 
unobjectionable.  Conservatism is well-positioned to explain the source of our unease: in both 
cases, the conclusion undermines the support lent by the premise to the second step.  So, nobody 
can acquire justification for Table-3 or Election-3 via these arguments - the threat of “easy 
justification” disappears.  Thus an advantage of the conservative diagnosis of Moorean anti-
skepticism is that it meshes well with our judgments about everyday cases.  
This conservative account of what is wrong with Moorean reasoning is extremely 
appealing.  In this paper, however, I intend to defend Moorean reasoning.  Does this mean I will 
argue that conservatism is false?  No, not exactly.  I will argue that conservatism is ambiguous 
because it makes a claim about “justification to believe” and different philosophers mean 
different things when they use this term.  I have no intention of defending any particular 
interpretation of “justification to believe” here.  Instead, I will argue that there is no 
interpretation of “justification to believe” wherein conservatism is both true and inconsistent 
with Moorean reasoning being good reasoning.  Either way, Mooreans are out of the woods: 
conservatism is either false or harmless.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: part 1 will discuss what is at issue in the debate 
over Moorean reasoning.  Part 2 will lay out the terms of the debate more carefully, and part 3 
contains a discussion of “justification to believe” that will allow me to distinguish two possible 
                                                
4 Cohen and Wright (2008) offer versions of this worry about Moorean reasoning; Cohen discusses easy knowledge, 
rather than easy justification, but the basic shape of the worry is the same. 
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version of conservatism.  The next two sections will offer a dilemma: part 4 will argue that one 
of the two versions of conservatism is implausibly strong, and part 5 will show that the other 
version cannot explain what is wrong with Moorean reasoning.  The remainder of the paper will 
tie up loose ends: part 6 will discuss a possible objection to my argument and clarify the scope of 
cases in which Moorean reasoning is appropriate, part 7 will use the material developed in parts 
3 through 5 to show what is wrong with a well-known argument against Mooreanism in formal 
epistemology, and part 8 will conclude by discussing rational agnosticism in light of distinctions 
made in part 3.   
 
 
2.1 WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER MOOREAN REASONING IS USELESS? 
 
Why does it matter what we say about Moorean reasoning?  First, and most famously, 
what we say about Mooreanism constrains what we say about evil demon-style skeptical 
arguments.  Jim Pryor has argued that a very common way of presenting such arguments is not at 
all compelling.9 Consider: 
 
Premise: (Simple-1) I do not have justification to believe that I am not being deceived by 
an evil demon  
Premise: (Simple-2) If I do not have justification to believe that I am not being deceived 
by an evil demon then I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
Therefore: (Simple-3) I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
 
It is not clear that anyone should lose any sleep over this argument.  The first premise is itself a 
skeptical conclusion, and hardly something that most people accept pre-philosophically.  So it 
                                                
9 This discussions of the shortcomings of the simple skeptical argument, and the existence of a more powerful 
alternative, follows Pryor (2000).   
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looks like we are free to reject it.  Yet without Simple-1, skeptics cannot make any mischief with 
this style of argument.   
However, skeptics can produce a more powerful argument that does not rely on anything 
so contentious as Simple-1.  The really worrying skeptical argument is: 
 
Premise: (Nasty-1) Either I do not have justification to believe that that I am being 
deceived by an evil demon or I do have justification to believe it, but my justification is 
based (at least in part) on beliefs justified by perception 
Premise: (Nasty-2) If I have justification to believe any proposition on the basis of 
perception, then I must have independent (of perception) justification to believe that I am 
not being deceived by an evil demon 
So: (Nasty-3) I do not have justification to believe that I am not being deceived by an evil 
demon 
Premise: (Nasty-4) If I do not have justification to believe that I am not being deceived 
by an evil demon then I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
Therefore: (Nasty-5) I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
 
The third step of this argument follows from the first two because Nasty-1 says that any 
justification I have to believe that I am not being deceived by an evil demon must depend upon 
perception, while Nasty-2 says that justification to believe anything on the basis of perception 
requires perception-independent justification to believe that I am not being deceived by an evil 
demon.  More simply, Nasty-1 says that justification to believe that I am not being deceived 
could only come from perception, while Nasty-2 says that justification to believe that I am not 
being deceived cannot come from perception.  Nasty-3 follows because there is nowhere left for 
justification for the anti-skeptical claim to come from.  
Nasty-1 is much weaker than Simple-1.  More importantly, Nasty-1, unlike Simple-1, is 
not a statement that most anti-skeptics can flatly reject.  So this argument looks sound—or in any 
case, the range of options for responding to skepticism is narrow—if Nasty-2 is true.  But Nasty-
2 is just the claim that Moorean reasoning, at least when it comes to perception, is no good.   
The situation regarding inductive skepticism is analogous.  Consider a familiar sort of 
argument:  
 
Premise: (Simple Induction-1) I do not have justification to believe that induction will be 
reliable in the future 
Premise: (Simple Induction-2) If I do not have justification to believe that induction will 
be reliable in the future then I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise 
tomorrow 
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Therefore: (Simple Induction-3) I do not have justification to believe that the sun will 
rise tomorrow 
 
Non-skeptics can comfortably deny Simple Induction-1, so this argument is not very powerful.  
The more worrying argument is: 
 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-1) Either I do not have justification to believe that that 
induction will be reliable in the future or I do have justification to believe it, but my 
justification is based (at least in part) on beliefs justified by induction 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-2) If I have justification to believe any proposition about the 
future on the basis of induction, then I must have independent (of induction) justification 
to believe that induction will be reliable in the future 
So: (Nasty Induction-3) I do not have justification to believe that induction will be 
reliable in the future 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-4) If I do not have justification to believe that induction will 
be reliable in the future then I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. 
Therefore: (Nasty-5) I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow 
 
There is no premise here that non-skeptics can flatly reject.  However, Mooreans reject Nasty 
Induction-2, since they think I can acquire justification to believe that induction will be reliable 
in the future via inductive inference.  Once again, Mooreanism is the most promising way to 
deflect a very powerful skeptical argument.   
The rejection of Moorean reasoning thus plays a crucial—if often tacit—role in some 
perennially vexing skeptical problems.  If we are going to get a handle on responding to these 
skeptical arguments, we must figure out whether Moorean reasoning is epistemically useless.  Of 
course, philosophers who reject Mooreanism need not be skeptics.  Non-Mooreans can avoid 
skepticism by embracing rationalism and saying that we can acquire justified beliefs in a host of 
important anti-skeptical claims—including I am not a handless brain in a vat and induction will 
be reliable in the future—via apriori, armchair reasoning.  The most compelling kind of 
rationalism says that apriori justification to believe in anti-skeptical claims does not rely on the 
use of any belief-forming method; rationalists can thus deny Nasty-1 and Nasty Induction-1 by 
saying that each of us has default justification to believe that she is not in a skeptical scenario.10  
                                                
10 The conservative anti-Mooreans White and Wright both embrace some version of rationalism.  Wright uses 
somewhat unconventional nomenclature, however: he refers to apriori “entitlement” to believe anti-skeptical claims; 
he reserves the term “justification” for bits of entitlement that we somehow earn, rather than possess by default.  
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Discussion of the merits and drawbacks of rationalism is a large topic, well beyond the scope of 
this paper; my aim here is to show how to defend Moorean reasoning and thereby make our 
menu of anti-skeptical options seem more appealing.    
One way of viewing the space of options here is that everyone must bite one bullet: we 
must choose between skepticism, rationalism, and Mooreanism.  If that is correct, there might be 
a “best fit” argument for Mooreanism.  If we can make rationalism and skepticism look bad 
enough, holding our nose and denying conservatism—and thus embracing Mooreanism—can 
look like the best option.  Fortunately, this bleak picture is incorrect: a more careful examination 
of conservatism will reveal that it gives us no reason to reject Mooreanism. 
 
2.2 WHAT, EXACTLY, IS CONSERVATISM? 
 
We need to make three concepts more precise before stating conservatism carefully.  The first 
concept is undermining.  Suppose Samantha has some evidence, E, for a proposition p; E is 
strong enough evidence to lend Samantha justification to believe that p.11  I’ll use the shorthand 
Support(E,p) to mean the rational support that E lends to p.  A defeater for p is a proposition 
such that, when Samantha comes to reasonably believe that it is true, she no longer has 
justification to believe that p.  One type of defeater is an outweighing defeater: a proposition 
that provides evidence for the falsity of p and thus renders belief in p inappropriate in spite of the 
reasons given by E for counting p true.  An outweighing defeater leaves Support(E,p) 
unchanged. Another type of defeater is an underminer.  Learning that an underminer is true 
eliminates Support(E,p).  For instance, suppose I see a happy looking crowd emerging from Shea 
stadium one summer night.  That evidence gives me justification to believe that the Mets just 
won a game.  Suppose I read in the paper the next day that the Mets lost: my justification to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Cohen eschews both rationalism and Mooreanism in favor of holism; discussion of Cohen’s positive view—which 
makes a distinction between two levels of knowledge—would take us very far afield.   
11 I won’t assume that all evidence is propositional; as I’ll use the term, sense experience can be evidence. 
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believe that they won has been outweighed.  Suppose instead that I ask someone in the crowd 
and they tell me that they came from a rock concert and the Mets played an away game: my 
justification to believe that the Mets just won has been undermined.12  I’ll call a proposition an 
anti-underminer if its negation is an underminer.   
The second concept is justification to believe, which I’ll also call propositional 
justification.  A statement such as “p is justified for Stuart” is ambiguous.  One sense of that 
phrase is: Stuart has adequate evidence and/or whatever else is needed to provide rational 
support for the proposition that p.  That is propositional justification, or justification to believe 
that p.  This definition is a bit imprecise and we will consider some ways of making it more exact 
later on, but it will suffice for now.  A second sense is: Stuart has an appropriate belief that p.  
This means that, first, Stuart believes that p; second, Stuart has propositional justification for p; 
third, Stuart’s belief that p is based—that is, psychologically dependent upon—the evidence (or 
whatever else) that lends him justification to believe that p.  When these three conditions are met, 
Stuart’s belief that p is doxastically justified.   
The third concept is independent propositional justification.  Though it is easy to gesture 
at the rough sense in which independent justification is used in formulating conservatism, it is 
very difficult to define independence precisely.  I will not attempt a precise definition here.  As a 
rough definition—good enough for our purposes—we can say that someone has p-independent 
justification to believe a proposition if it is possible for someone with his evidence to reason his 
way to a justified belief in that proposition without going through p as an intermediate step. 
 We are now in a position to give a careful statement of conservatism: 
 
Conservatism: S can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if S has p-
independent justification to believe each of the anti-underminerS for Support(E,p).13 14 
                                                
12 Many propositions diminish Support(E,p) to some degree.  I will use the term underminer, though, only to refer to 
propositions that eliminate Support(E,p) entirely.  
13 The formulation I have given is in terms of all-or-nothing justification.  However, fans of degrees of justification 
will want to endorse a slightly more general formulation of conservatism, namely: 
 
Conservatism*: S can additional rational support for p on the basis of E only to the degree that he has p-
independent justification to believe anti-underminers for Support(E,p). 
 
For the sake of simplicity, I will stick to the all-or-nothing formulation; the difference won’t matter for the purposes 
of this paper. 
14 Not everyone who writes about this issue defines liberalism and conservatism as I do here: while I have 
represented conservatism as a conditional,  
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I will call anyone who denies conservatism a liberal.15  It is important not to overstate the 
difference between liberalism and conservatism.  The two positions are closer than they may 
initially appear in two ways.  First, liberals may agree that S can only acquire additional support 
to believe that p on the basis of E if she has p-independent justification to believe some of the 
relevant anti-underminers, or that she sometimes needs justification for all of the relevant anti-
underminers.  Second, both liberals and conservatives agree that when someone ought to believe 
that an underminer for Support(E,p) is true, he cannot acquire justification to believe that p on 
the basis of E.  All parties also agree that when someone ought to believe that all of the 
underminers for Support(E,p) are false there is no obstacle for him acquiring justification for p 
on the basis of E.  Liberalism and conservatism give different verdicts only in cases where 
someone is rationally agnostic about at least one relevant underminer.  The disagreement 
between liberals and conservatives centers on the force of rational agnosticism: is being 
rationally agnostic about an underminer for Support(E,p) enough to threaten the support that E 
lends to p?  
I will call a bit of reasoning Moorean if it involves acquiring a belief that p on the basis 
of E, and then involves acquiring a belief in some anti-underminer for Support(E,p) on the basis 
of p; I will call someone a Moorean if he thinks that Moorean reasoning is a way to acquire 
justification to believe its conclusion for the very first time.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(S can acquire support to believe p on the basis of E)!(S has p-independent justification to believe all of 
the anti-underminers for Support(E,p)) 
 
it is common to represent conservatism as some sort of claim involving “because” or “in virtue of”, such as: 
 
S can acquire support to believe that p on the basis of E only in virtue of having p-independent justification 
to believe all of the anti-underminers for Support(E,p)   
 
I will focus on the conditional since it is unclear to me just what “in virtue of” means in this context.  My way of 
formulating the issue simplifies the logical space.  For instance, Nico Silins (2008) describes his view as non-
Moorean liberalism.  He argues against conservatism by saying that rational support to believe that p need not be in 
virtue of justification to believe the relevant anti-underminers, yet he does embrace conservatism in my sense.  On 
my way of describing thing, Silins is just a conservative.  Indeed I think Silins’s argument shows why, obscurity 
aside, the in virtue of claim does not carve at the relevant joints: since the conditional is adequate to block Moorean 
arguments, making the in virtue of claim needlessly exposes conservatism to additional objections.   
15 This terminology follows Pryor (2004) and (2008).  It is common to use the term “dogmatism” to refer to what I 
call liberalism; strictly speaking, dogmatism refers to a species of anti-conservatism about perceptual beliefs only.   
 18 
 To get clear on just what conservatism means, we need to pin down the notion of 
propositional justification more precisely; once we have made a few more distinctions, we will 
be in a position to pose a dilemma involving the meaning of “propositional justification” in the 
formulation of conservatism. 
 
2.3 JUSTIFICATION AND TWO KINDS OF EVIDENCE 
 
Before nailing down the different senses of propositional justification, I need to make a pair of 
observations about three other notions: first, appropriate—or doxastically justified—belief; 
second, evidence; third, good reasoning.   
The first observation is about the relationship between evidence and doxastically justified 
belief.  There are two principles about the epistemic role of evidence that are widely considered 
platitudes: first, that people ought to apportion their degrees of confidence according to the 
evidence, and second that some fact is evidence for (or against) p only if it “bears on” the truth of 
p or indicates that p is more (or less) likely to be true.  It turns out, though, that these two 
principles sit very uneasily with one another.  Often someone ought to adjust her confidence in p 
upon learning facts that do not indicate that p is any more or less likely to be true.  Consider: 
 
The Unsuccessful Detective: Detective Smith is investigating a murder; his current theory is 
that the butler did it.  Detective Smith has a bunch of evidence that the butler did it: the butler 
had a motive, his alibi was uncorroborated, footprints in the victim’s blood match the butler’s 
shoes, and so on.  On the basis of this evidence, Detective Smith becomes very confident that the 
butler did it.  Then, at a slightly later time, Detective Smith learns something: he has an 
incredibly poor track record of solving cases.  A new, extremely reliable DNA testing technology 
reveals that his theories in a huge number of previous cases—cases in which he was quite 
confident that he knew who had committed the crime—turn out to have been wrong.  When 
Detective Smith learns that he has a poor track record, he becomes a good deal less confident 
that the butler did it. 
 
It is clearly reasonable for Detective Smith to revise his confidence down in light of the new 
evidence about his track record – indeed, it would be unreasonable for him not to do so.  But this 
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thought can appear puzzling: after all, we might think that a hallmark of epistemic rationality is 
that one should revise one’s confidence in a proposition p only on the basis of acquiring evidence 
that is relevant to whether p.  Yet, the new evidence—that Detective Smith has a poor track 
record—is irrelevant to whether the butler did it.  Certainly if I were investigating the murder, I 
would want to know what the crime scene looked like, what the butler’s alibi was, and so on: but 
whether Detective Smith is good at his job wouldn’t be relevant information.  What’s going on 
here? 
The evidence that determines how confident Detective Smith ought to be that the butler 
did it falls into two categories.  The first category contains evidence that is relevant to whether 
the butler did it: the butler’s alibi, motive, footprints, and so on.  Call this object-directed 
evidence, since it bears on the object of Detective Smith’s attitude.  A second type of evidence 
does not bear at all on the object of Detective Smith’s attitude, yet does affect how confidently 
he can hold that attitude: in this case, the revelation that Detective Smith has a poor track record.  
Call this reasoning-directed evidence, since it affects the rational confidence that Detective 
Smith can have in p not by bearing on whether p, but rather by bearing on whether he is able to 
figure out whether p via reasoning from the clues of the case.  Detective Smith ought to adjust 
his attitude towards whether the butler did it in response to both kinds of evidence.  The first 
observation, then, is that rationally responding to one’s evidence means taking both object- and 
reasoning-directed evidence into account.16 
The second observation concerns the relationship between evidence and routes of good 
reasoning.  Reasoning-directed evidence does not, typically, just diminish the rational confidence 
that someone ought to have in a proposition tout court; rather, it diminishes the confidence that 
someone ought to have in a proposition given that it rests on a certain kind of reasoning.  For 
instance, evidence of Detective Smith’s poor track record in determining the culprit via 
examining the clues should lower his confidence that the butler did it insofar as that conclusion is 
based on his reasoning from the clues.  However, if a reliable source with a good track record—
                                                
16 David Christensen, in his unpublished manuscript “Higher-Order Evidence”, describes the distinction between 
what I call object-directed and reasoning-directed evidence at some length.  He uses the term “higher-order 
evidence” to refer to what I call reasoning-directed evidence.  I think his nomenclature is seriously misleading: 
“higher-order” evidence sounds like evidence about evidence, whereas what he is talking about is evidence about 
one’s reasoning ability.  Beyond that quibble, though, his discussion of the rational response to evidence of 
fallibility is excellent and far more thorough than my quick remarks here. 
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Sherlock Holmes, say—tells Detective Smith that the butler did it, Smith can be quite confident 
that the butler did it.  His reasoning-directed evidence gives no cause to doubt his ability to form 
true beliefs via the testimony of others.  Reasoning-directed evidence can defeat reasoning from 
one body of evidence—say, the clues—to a proposition but leave reasoning from another body 
of evidence—say, Holmes’s testimony—untouched.  The second observation, then, is that 
reasoning-directed evidence can generate “fine grained” defeat: that is, it can defeat any path of 
reasoning from one body of evidence to a given proposition while leaving paths of reasoning 
from other bodies of evidence to that very same proposition unscathed.   
In sum, there are three kinds of evidence that can make someone rationally less confident 
that p: 
 
1. Outweighing defeaters: object-directed evidence that ~p.   
 
2. Undermining defeaters: object-directed evidence that some evidence E does not 
indicate the truth of p.  Underminers for Support(E,p) should lower someone’s 
confidence in p insofar as that confidence is based on E – someone who believes that p 
for another reason shouldn’t alter her confidence in light of acquiring undermining 
evidence for Support(E,p).   
 
3. Reasoning-directed defeaters: evidence that one shouldn’t trust one’s ability to figure 
out whether p on the basis of E.  This, too, should only lower someone’s confidence in p 
insofar as it is based on E.  But it only has this effect on one person – other people who 
believe that p on the basis of E shouldn’t lower their confidence one bit when they 
discover that Detective Smith’s ability to figure out whether p on the basis of E is not so 
hot.17 
 
Note that the same fact can be more than one type of evidence, depending on who learns it and 
what else they believe.  For instance, the fact that Detective Smith has a poor track record is 
reasoning-directed evidence for Detective Smith.  However, if I believe that the butler did it 
based on the testimony of Detective Smith, then for me this evidence is an underminer—a kind 
                                                
17 We can differentiate the three types of defeater in formal terms.  Call O an outweighing defeater for p, U an 
undermining defeater for Support(E,p), and R a reasoning-directed defeater for S concluding that p on the basis of E.  
Pr(p|O)<Pr(p), whereas Pr(p|U and E)=Pr(p).  Reasoning directed defeaters behave quite differently: Pr(p|E and 
R)=Pr(p|E), yet my confidence in p upon learning E and R should be lower than my confidence in p upon learning E 
alone. See section 7 for further discussion of this point.   
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of object-directed evidence—for the support that Detective Smith’s verdict gives for the 
conclusion that the butler did it.     
With our two observations in mind we can ask about the relationship between 
propositional justification, evidence, and good reasoning.  In particular, does having 
propositional justification for p always entail the existence of a sound, undefeated reasoning 
route from one’s evidence to the conclusion that p?  I will call views of propositional 
justification wherein the answer is “ yes” robust views of propositional justification and views 
wherein the answer is “no” anemic views of propositional justification.  The two types of view 
differ in cases where S has good object-directed evidence for a proposition p, but there does not 
exist a sound, undefeated deliberative route from his evidence to p since all such routes are 
blocked by reasoning-directed defeat (they may differ in other cases as well, but I’ll focus on 
examples involving reasoning-directed defeat).  In cases like this, anemic views can say that S 
has propositional justification for p, but robust views must say that he lacks propositional 
justification for p.  
We can plug each type of view of propositional justification into conservatism and get 
either: 
 
Robust Conservatism: S can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if 
there is some p-independent sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from S’s evidence which 
concludes in doxastically justified beliefs in each of the anti-underminers for 
Support(E,p).   
 
or 
Anemic Conservatism: S can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he 
has p-independent justification to believe each of the anti-underminers for Support(E,p), 
where this justification need not involve the existence of a sound, undefeated bit of 
reasoning from S’s evidence to a doxastically justified beliefs in the anti-underminers.  
 
These two versions of conservatism agree that someone can acquire justification to 
believe that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent epistemic grip on relevant 
anti-underminers.  What they disagree about is how strong this epistemic grip needs to 
be.  Robust Conservatism says the grip must be fairly strong.  There must be a good piece 
of p-independent reasoning from one’s evidence to the relevant anti-underminers; 
moreover, one’s evidence must not include anything that provides reasoning-directed 
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defeat for beliefs in the relevant anti-underminers.  Anemic Conservatism denies that 
one’s grip on the relevant anti-underminers need be quite this strong; in particular, 
Anemic Conservatives are happy to countenance acquiring a justified belief that p on the 
basis of E while having reasoning-directed defeaters that prevent forming a justified 
belief in some anti-underminer for Support(E,p).  This minor difference in how the two 
views treat reasoning-directed defeat has surprisingly strong ramifications for what each 
type of conservative ought to say about Moorean reasoning.   
I do not think there is any answer to the question “Which of these is the correct 
conception of propositional justification?”  The term “propositional justification” is just a 
bit of jargon, and philosophers can use it however they want.  I suspect that most 
epistemologists have something like Robust Conservatism in mind when they use the 
term, but I doubt whether there is universal agreement.  In the next two sections I will 
argue that neither of these two versions of conservatism can show what is wrong with 
Moorean reasoning: Robust Conservatism is false, and Anemic Conservatism is 
consistent with Moorean reasoning being good reasoning.  Since the robust and anemic 
views exhaust the logical space for understandings of propositional justification—
propositional justification for p either entails the existence of a good bit of reasoning that 
concludes that p or it doesn’t—this creates a dilemma for fans of the view that 
conservatism can tell us what is wrong with Moorean reasoning.    
 
2.4 AGAINST ROBUST CONSERVATISM 
 
Robust Conservatism says that if S can acquire justification to believe that p on the basis 
of E, then there must be sound deliberative routes from his evidence to each of the anti-
underminers for Support(E,p).  Any counterexample to Robust Conservatism must have 
the following two features: 
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1) There is no sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from S’s evidence that concludes in a 
doxastically justified belief in some anti-underminer for Support(E,p). 
 
2) S is clearly able to acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of reasoning from E. 
 
It is easy to formulate such counterexamples.  Consider: 
 
The Mediocre Mathematician: Stan knows himself to be mediocre at math.  One day a friend 
asks him if, in general, assuming that a proposition is false and then deriving a contradiction is 
sufficient to establish that the proposition is true.  Stan, quite appropriately, says he’s stumped: 
he just has no idea how to assess if a method of proof is kosher.  He is rationally agnostic about 
whether reductio ad absurdum is a valid method of argument.  Later Stan is wondering whether 
there are any even prime numbers besides 2.  He thinks to himself: suppose n is an even prime 
number (and not 2), then, since n is even, it is divisible by 2, but since it is prime (and not 2), it is 
not divisible by 2.  He concludes that there are no even primes besides 2 – and this belief is 
justified.   
 
 
The Persuasive Lecture: Seth becomes convinced by a persuasive lecture by a respected 
authority on ethics who claims that while we should trust our ordinary judgments about the 
rightness or wrongness of individual acts, it is impossible to tell whether our faculties for making 
moral judgments are reliable (since the only yardstick we can use to measure their accuracy is 
our own judgments).  Seth can’t really follow the details of the arguments, but since the lecturer 
is respected, he concludes that it must be true that we can trust our ordinary moral judgments and 
that nobody can say whether his own faculties for making moral judgments are reliable.  Seth 
sees some children setting a cat on fire, and forms a justified belief that they are acting wrongly, 
while being rationally agnostic about the proposition my faculties for making moral judgments 
are reliable.   
 
 
The Seasoned Interviewer: Sasha has interviewed many criminal suspects for the police, and 
she is very good at her job.  After much practice and study, she is excellent at telling truth from 
lies and she knows it.  One day a colleague asks Sasha if a suspect who frequently touches his 
nose during an interview is more likely to be lying.  Sasha replies, truthfully, that she isn’t sure; 
she finds it very hard to articulate such rules in the abstract since her previous attempts to do so 
have been unsuccessful.  Shortly thereafter, Sasha interviews a suspect who frequently touches 
his nose.  Sasha acquires a justified belief that the suspect is lying, and her belief is based, in 
large part, on his frequent nose-touching. 
 
This list could go on.  While any one example might be open to objection, the pattern is clear. In 
each of these cases, someone is able to form a justified belief that p on the basis of E while being 
rationally agnostic about some anti-underminer for Support(E,p).  Robust Conservatism is false.  
All of these counterexamples have the same structure: there is a reasoning-directed defeater that 
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prevents any reasoning from S’s evidence to some anti-underminer from being good reasoning.  
It is reasoning-directed evidence that blocks any good reasoning from Sasha’s evidence to 
frequent nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty, from Seth’s evidence to my faculties for making 
moral judgments are reliable, and from Stan’s evidence to reductio ad absurdum is a valid 
argument form.  Yet these reasoning-directed defeaters do not block paths of good reasoning 
concluding the suspect is lying, setting a cat on fire is wrong, or there are no even prime 
numbers greater than 2. 
The problem for Robust Conservatism is that reasoning-directed evidence can be fine-
grained: it can thus defeat good reasoning concluding in one proposition while leaving reasoning 
towards some nearby propositions untouched.  For instance, in the case of the Mediocre 
Mathematician, reasoning-directed evidence defeats any reasoning from Stan’s evidence to 
complicated or difficult-to-establish mathematical claims, but not to simple or easily grasped 
ones.  He thus reasonably doubts his ability to figure out whether reductio ad absurdum is 
kosher, but does not doubt his ability to conduct simple proofs of claims such as there are no 
even primes greater than 2.18 The point is not that it’s harder to have propositional justification 
for complex or difficult-to-establish mathematical claims.  Rather, the point is that if you have 
evidence that you cannot reliably figure out whether complex or difficult-to-establish 
mathematical claims are true—as most of us do, and Stan does in spades—then it’s harder to 
have propositional justification for complex or difficult-to-establish mathematical truths.   
It’s worth distinguishing the problem I have identified here from a common—but 
unsuccessful—complaint about conservatism.  Some philosophers worry that conservatism 
makes it impossible for all but the most cognitively sophisticated thinkers to acquire rational 
support to believe much of anything.  Let’s make this worry concrete with an example: 
 
The Naïve Reasoner: Sarah is a normal child of age 4.  One day Sarah sees that it is raining 
outside and she forms the belief that the ground is wet.  Sarah does not have any attitude about 
the underminer there is a giant tarp covering the ground outside.  Indeed, she lacks the concept 
TARP and so has no beliefs about the presence or absence of tarps.      
                                                
18 One might grant this point, but still think that agnosticism about reductio ad absurdum ought to somewhat 
diminish one’s confidence in there are no even primes greater than 2.  I do not disagree with this thought.  All that 
matters is that belief in there are no even primes greater than 2 is doxastically justified in spite of rational 
agnosticism about the anti-underminer; the counterexample does not require that this justification is completely 
unscathed by rational agnosticism about the anti-underminer.   
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Here’s why this case might be trouble.  Sarah’s belief that the ground is wet is justified.  The 
proposition there is no giant tarp covering the ground outside is an anti-underminer for Sarah 
acquiring justification to believe that the ground is wet based on the evidence that it is raining.  
So, conservatism says that Sarah must have independent (of her belief that the ground is wet) 
justification to believe that there is no giant tarp covering the ground outside if she can acquire 
justification to believe that the ground is wet given her evidence that it is raining.  Yet Sarah 
cannot so much as entertain that anti-underminer: it involves the concept TARP, which she lacks.   
This example does not cause any problems because conservatives need not claim that 
Sarah needs to believe all of the relevant anti-underminers, or even that she be capable of 
believing them.  All conservatives need to say is that Sarah must have propositional justification 
for anti-underminers, which she has.  There is a sound, undefeated deliberative route from 
Sarah’s evidence—which includes the fact that the ground is usually uncovered—to the 
conclusion that there is no giant tarp covering the ground outside via inductive inference.  Sarah 
cannot perform that inference, but it is no part of conservatism to insist that she be able to do so.  
If conservatives said that Sarah needed doxastically justified beliefs in the relevant underminers, 
this case would present trouble; but they don’t, so it doesn’t.   
What is the difference between this unsuccessful objection and my own objection?  The 
unsuccessful objection accuses conservatism of having implausible implications in cases where 
someone’s impoverished capacities prevent her from being able to believe an anti-underminer.  
My objection accuses conservatism of having implausible implications in cases where someone’s 
evidence is inconsistent with appropriately believing an anti-underminer.  In the case where 
impoverished capacities prevent the formation of a doxastically justified belief, Robust 
Conservatives can say that Sarah has propositional justification for the ground is wet.  In the 
earlier cases—where evidence defeats all of the available routes of reasoning to the relevant anti 
underminers—they cannot.    
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2.5 ANEMIC CONSERVATISM TO THE RESCUE? 
 
The counterexamples in the previous section all turned on plugging the robust conception of 
propositional justification into conservatism; if we replace that view of propositional justification 
with a weaker one, we get some version of: 
 
Anemic Conservatism: S can acquire additional rational support to believe that p on the 
basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe each of the anti-
underminers for Support(E,p), where this justification need not involve the existence of a 
sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from S’s evidence to a doxastically justified belief that 
p. 
 
Of course, Anemic Conservatism is not so much a particular view but a family of views.  To get 
a positive story about just what conservatism means, we would also need some necessary or 
sufficient conditions for having propositional justification; as it stands, all Anemic Conservatism 
tells us about propositional justification is what it does not entail.  Many forms of Anemic 
Conservatism can survive the counterexamples of the previous section.  However, all forms of 
Anemic Conservatism are consistent with Moorean reasoning sometimes being good reasoning.   
The problem cases arise when someone is in a position where:  
 
(a) He has p-independent justification to believe that ~U in the anemic sense 
 
(b) There is no p-independent sound reasoning from his evidence which concludes in a 
doxastically justified belief that ~U; that is, he lacks p-independent justification to 
believe that ~U in the robust sense.   
 
(c) He can form a doxastically justified belief that ~U via reasoning from p, perhaps 
along with other premises.  That is, he can have p-dependent justification to believe ~U 
in the robust sense.   
 
If someone is in this position, prior to acquiring E there is no way for anyone with his evidence 
to form a doxastically justified belief that ~U (that’s condition (b)).  However, when he acquires 
evidence E, he can form a justified belief that p (that follows from (a) and Anemic 
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Conservatism).  He can then form a doxastically justified belief that ~U via inference from p 
(that’s condition (c)).  But that’s just Moorean reasoning.   
As a concrete example, consider a particular species of Anemic Conservatism: 
 
Object-Directed Conservatism: S can acquire additional rational support to believe that 
p on the basis of E only if he has, independent of p, adequate object-directed evidence for 
each of the anti-underminers for Support(E,p).   
 
By adequate object-directed evidence for an anti-underminer I mean enough object-directed 
evidence for someone—perhaps someone with different conceptual capacities or different 
reasoning-directed evidence—to form a doxastically justified belief in that anti-underminer.  
Here is a case where Object-Directed Conservatism licenses Moorean reasoning:  
 
The Seasoned Interviewer Redux: As before, Sasha is an excellent and experienced police 
interviewer.  Also as before, Sasha sincerely pleads agnosticism when a colleague asks her if a 
suspect who frequently touches his nose during an interview is more likely to be lying – she 
finds it hard to reason about such rules in the abstract and has a poor track record when doing so.  
Shortly thereafter, Sasha interviews a suspect who frequently touches his nose.  Sasha forms a 
justified belief that the suspect his lying and this belief is based, in large part, on his frequent 
nose-touching.  After the interview, Sasha remembers her colleague’s question.  She realizes that 
nose-touching seemed to her a clear sign that the subject was lying.  She concludes that frequent 
nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty after all. 
 
Sasha has engaged in some Moorean reasoning here.   According to Object-Directed 
Conservatism, Sasha’s reasoning is kosher.  Here is why: 
 
(a’) Prior to conducting her interview with the nose-touching suspect, Sasha has adequate 
object-directed evidence to believe that frequent nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty 
(and, we will assume, all of the other anti-underminers for Support(the suspect is 
touching his nose frequently, the suspect is lying)) so according to Object-Directed 
Conservatism there is no obstacle to Sasha acquiring a justified belief that the suspect is 
lying based on his frequent nose-touching. 
 
(b’) Prior to conducting her interview, there is no sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from 
Sasha’s evidence to the conclusion frequent nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty – all 
such routes are defeated by Sasha’s evidence that she is no good at reasoning about such 
rules in the abstract. 
 
(c’) Sasha can form a doxastically justified belief in frequent nose-touching is a sign of 
dishonesty via reasoning from the suspect is lying and the knowledge that her belief that 
the suspect is lying is based upon his frequent nose-touching.   
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So, prior to conducting the interview, Sasha is rationally agnostic about frequent nose-touching 
is a sign of dishonesty.  But, once she does conduct the interview, she can form a justified belief 
that the suspect is lying, and then a justified belief in frequent nose-touching is a sign of 
dishonesty.  There is nothing wrong with this Moorean pattern of reasoning – at least, not 
according to Object-Directed Conservatism. 
Nothing I have said here should be construed as an attack on Anemic Conservatism.  I 
strongly suspect that some form of Anemic Conservatism is true.  Rather, my point is that the 
incompatibility of conservatism and Mooreanism is not so easy to establish.  The incompatibility 
depends upon plugging the robust conception of propositional justification into conservatism. 
Anemic Conservatism allows someone to form a belief in p on the basis of E without the 
existence of a sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from his evidence to some anti-underminers for 
Support(E,p).  However, once he has justification to believe that p, new, undefeated routes of 
reasoning to beliefs in anti-underminers open up.  It’s precisely the anemia that licenses Moorean 
reasoning.   
 
2.6 SKEPTICISM AND MOOREANISM 
 
So far I have shown that Robust Conservatism delivers false results in situations involving 
reasoning-directed defeat and that Anemic Conservatism is too weak to block Moorean 
reasoning.  So there is no version of conservatism that is both true and capable of explaining 
what is wrong with Moorean reasoning.  But perhaps foes of Mooreanism can pull off a strategic 
retreat with something like the following line: 
 
Robust Conservatism is indeed false; it badly misfires in cases involving reasoning-
directed defeat.  But that gives us no reason to believe that Robust Conservatism is not at 
least roughly correct – we should not abandon it it, but rather insert a proviso that it does 
not apply in cases where reasoning-directed evidence blocks justification to believe an 
anti-underminer.   
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I do not think this line of retreat is worryingly ad hoc: the only cases where robust and 
anemic versions of conservatism diverge involve reasoning-directed defeat, so it is natural to 
wonder whether we can set such cases aside and keep an otherwise promising position more-or-
less intact.  Everything that I have said so far is consistent with conservatism being correct in 
cases that do not involve reasoning-directed defeat; indeed, I strongly suspect that it is correct in 
such cases.  However, while this retreat might help to make conservatism incompatible with 
some Moorean reasoning, it will do no good in the important cases.  Call the cases where this 
line of retreat admits that Robust Conservatism misfires—cases where reasoning-directed 
evidence blocks justification to believe an anti-underminer—problem cases.  Fans of 
Mooreanism as an anti-skeptical strategy can point out that the skeptical arguments discussed in 
part 2 are problem cases.  Recall: 
 
Enabling condition: (Moore-1) [an experience as of a hand] 
So: (Moore-2) I have a hand 
Therefore: (Moore-3) I am not a handless brain in a vat 
 
Earlier we saw two prominent non-skeptical diagnoses of this argument: Mooreans think that this 
reasoning can generate justification to believe the conclusion for the first time whereas 
conservative rationalists think that someone can perform this reasoning only if he already has 
justification to believe the conclusion.  But we should now think to ask rationalists whether this 
is justification in a robust or anemic sense.  If it’s anemic, Moore’s proof can still be a way to 
acquire a justified belief in its conclusion for the first time.  If it is robust, there must have been a 
prior, p-independent route of sound, undefeated reasoning from Moore’s evidence to p.  If 
rationalism is to be an alternative to Mooreanism, alternative Moorean routes of reasoning—
routes that involve the use of beliefs acquired via perception—won’t do.  So the alternative route 
must consist of armchair reasoning: the sort of reasoning one can engage in without any 
perceptual inputs.  But I doubt very much whether any such route is available.  In particular, such 
a route could only provide Moore with robust justification to believe that he is not a handless 
brain in a vat if his reasoning-directed evidence is consistent with trusting himself to reliably 
determine which deeply contingent propositions about his surroundings are true based on pure 
armchair reflection.  But I don’t think any of us has reasoning-directed evidence consistent with 
trusting ourselves to figure out what the actual world happens to be like by armchair reflection 
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alone.  So this is a problem case: there is reasoning-directed defeat that prevents anyone from 
determining that he is not a handless brain in a vat from the armchair.  If Robust Conservatism 
misfires when dealing with problem cases, Robust Conservatism misfires when dealing with 
Moore’s proof itself.   
A similar story applies to Induction 1-3.  Perhaps we have evidence about what will 
happen in the future.  But none of us, I think, has reasoning-directed evidence consistent with 
trusting herself to figure out what the future will be like without using induction.  So this case, 
too, is a problem case: even if we have justification to believe that induction will be reliable in 
the future in some anemic sense, our reasoning-directed evidence is inconsistent with having 
such justification in a robust sense unless we can acquire it using Moorean reasoning.  
The upshot is that the retreat can, at best, establish that Moorean reasoning from E to p 
and then from p to ~U is epistemically useful when, and only when, reasoning-directed defeaters 
block alternative reasoning routes to ~U but do not block reasoning from p to ~U.  In day-to-day 
life, these situations are rare.  Most of the time Moorean reasoning is indeed useless.  Recall our 
earlier pedestrian examples of Moorean reasoning: 
 
Premise: (Table-1) This table looks red 
So: (Table-2) This table is red 
Therefore: (Table-3) This is not a white table under red lights 
 
 
Premise: (Election-1) Someone just checked a box on a piece of paper and slid it into a 
slot 
So: (Election-2) Someone just voted 
Therefore: (Election-3) An election is happening, rather than a rehearsal 
 
The diagnosis on offer says that these bits of reasoning are indeed epistemically useless, since 
none of us has reasoning-directed evidence that she cannot determine whether the lighting in a 
room is red or whether an election is occurring by any non-Moorean methods.  So, there is no 
threat of “easy justification”: Moorean reasoning really is epistemically useless in these everyday 
cases.  However, in rare cases Moorean reasoning is fine; as it happens, these rare cases include 
responses to global skeptical hypotheses.  Moorean reasoning is indeed usually bad reasoning: 
philosophers who look askance at Moore’s proof are right about that.  However, Moorean 
reasoning is fine in narrowly-defined cases – and, in particular, it is fine when skeptics generate 
reasoning-directed doubt about anti-underminers.   
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So much, then, for showing that neither version of conservatism can block Moorean 
reasoning.  Fans of Mooreanism may worry about the strategy of just conceding that some form 
of Anemic Conservatism is true on the grounds that this strategy can avoid skepticism only by 
conceding that some form of rationalism is true.  After all, Moorean reasoning is only consistent 
with Anemic Conservatism for those who have antecedent anemic justification to believe I am 
not a handless brain in a vat.  Such justification must be antecedent to all perceptual beliefs, i.e. 
apriori.  Part of the appeal of Mooreanism is that allows a non-rationalist solution to skeptical 
worries; my solution just seems to retreat on this front.   
Of course, nothing I have said here requires that Anemic Conservatism is true; I don’t 
have a good argument against it, but everything I have said here is consistent with its falsity.  In 
addition, it is not clear how bad anemic apriori justification to believe anti-skeptical hypotheses 
is: granting that such anemic rationalism is true may not be a large concession since it is 
consistent with saying that nobody can form justified beliefs in anti-skeptical hypotheses without 
evidence acquired from experience.  It is not at all clear to me that, whatever the best arguments 
against rationalism are, they make trouble even for anemic forms of rationalism.  Finally, though, 
there are some considerations in formal epistemology that strongly suggest that some form of 
anemic rationalism must be true; I will look at these arguments in some detail in the next section.  
 
2.7 BAYESIANISM AND CONSERVATISM 
 
So far I have argued that Robust Conservatism is false and Anemic Conservatism is consistent 
with Mooreanism.  In this section I will argue that the same question that makes trouble for 
conservative opponents of Mooreanism—whether conservatism is a claim about propositional 
justification in the robust or anemic sense—also makes trouble for the most compelling 
argument in favor of conservatism.  The argument I have in mind tries to show that both 
liberalism and Moorean reasoning are inconsistent with Bayesianism.  This argument is well 
regarded by both liberals and conservatives.  The latter see it as a reason to abandon liberalism, 
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the former as a reason to abandon orthodox Bayesianism: that is, to give up the view that 
epistemic probability, or rational credence, is governed synchronically by the norms of 
probabilistic coherence and diachronically by the claim that Pr(p) upon learning that E should 
equal one’s prior Pr(p|E).19  If this argument is sound, Mooreans face a puzzle.  Fortunately, 
though, both sides have got it wrong by overstating what conclusions about propositional 
justification we can read off of the Bayesian formalism. 
The argument rests on the following formal results showing that my confidence in an 
ordinary proposition on the basis of some evidence E cannot exceed the rational confidence that I 
had in some anti-underminer prior to learning that E. For example: 
 
Pr(I am perceiving a hand right now|I am currently having an experience of a hand) ! Pr(I am 
not a BIV being deceived into thinking I am seeing a hand) 
 
Pr(I know that it will be cold in Pittsburgh next January on the basis of induction|all previous 
Januaries in Pittsburgh have been cold) ! Pr(I am not in a world where the laws of meteorology 
change abruptly in 2010) 
 
It is easy to see why these inequalities hold.  First, my confidence that I am currently perceiving 
a hand cannot exceed my confidence that I am not a deceived BIV (since I am a deceived BIV 
entails I am not perceiving a hand).  So for any body of evidence E,  
 
Pr(I am perceiving a hand right now|E) ! Pr(I am not a BIV being deceived into  
thinking I am seeing a hand|E).   
 
Second, having a perceptual experience as of a hand increases, rather than decreases, the 
epistemic probability of I am a BIV being deceived into thinking I am seeing a hand.  Together, 
these claims imply that my confidence that I am perceiving a hand after having an experience as 
of a hand cannot exceed my prior confidence in I am a BIV being deceived into thinking I am 
seeing a hand.  Analogous reasoning applies in the inductive case.  On the basis of these sorts of 
results, it can seem like I can only have justification to believe that I am perceiving a hand right 
now on the basis that I am currently having an experience as of a hand if I have antecedent or 
                                                
19 The most fully-developed version of the Bayesian argument against liberalism appears in White; a quicker version 
appears in Schiffer.  Pryor (in his unpublished manuscript “Uncertainty and Undermining”) and Weatherson both 
acknowledge the force of the argument and accordingly urge revision of Bayesianism to accommodate liberalism.  
Silins also cites a similar argument which he uses to develop a view that mixes liberalism with rationalism. 
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independent justification to believe that I am not a brain-in-a-vat being deceived into having an 
experience of a hand.   
But of course, we cannot read that result about propositional justification from some 
formal results about epistemic probability.  In particular, we can only read conservatism off of 
these results given the following assumption:  
 
Auxiliary Thesis about Independent Justification (or ATIJ): if someone believes that X on the 
basis of E, and the probability of Y prior to learning that E is an upper bound on the probability 
of X after learning that E, justification to believe that Y must be independent of justification to 
believe that X. 20  
 
Why believe ATIJ?  ATIJ says that that if my credence in Y before acquiring evidence E is an 
upper bound on my credence in X after learning that E (where X is based on E), then if X is 
justified on the basis of E then I must have independent justification to believe that Y.  The 
thought is that if X is justified on the basis of E, Pr(X|E) must be high enough to make believing 
that X appropriate upon updating on E.  Since Pr(Y) is an upper bound on Pr(X|E), the prior 
probability of Y is an upper bound on the probability of X upon learning E.  So the prior 
probability of Y must be high enough to render belief in Y justified.  Since Y had this degree of 
probability before X was justified, Y having this degree of probability cannot possibly depend on 
X being justified.  So, justification to believe that Y must be independent of justification to 
believe that X.   
ATIJ is a claim about propositional justification, so of course we should pause to ask: is it 
a claim about robust or anemic justification?  This question yields a familiar dilemma.  One the 
one hand, if ATIJ is a claim about robust propositional justification it is false.  On the other 
hand, if ATIJ is a claim about anemic propositional justification it makes no trouble for 
Mooreans.  To see why ATIJ is false if interpreted as a claim about robust propositional 
justification, consider a case involving reasoning-directed defeat: 
 
The Failed Logician: Stella took, and failed, a logic class in college.  She had particular 
difficulty mastering conditionals.  One day Stella learns that E, which is in fact excellent 
evidence for p, and becomes extremely rationally confident that p.  Yet she is rightly agnostic 
about all material conditionals, including E!p.  She remembers that the rules governing 
conditionals are a bit tricky and counterintuitive, so she is rightly leery of committing to any.   
                                                
20 I owe this point to Pryor, who makes it in his unpublished manuscript “Uncertainty and Undermining”. 
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The conditional E!p is an upper bound on Stella’s confidence in p, and Pr(E!p|E) ! Pr(E!p), 
so according to ATIJ Stella can have justification to believe that p on the basis of E only if she 
has p-independent justification to believe the conditional E!p.  Yet she lacks justification to 
believe that conditional in the robust sense—a reasoning-directed defeater prevents anyone with 
her evidence from engaging in sound reasoning concluding in E!p—so, according to robust 
ATIJ, she cannot form a justified belief that p.  But that’s absurd: it cannot be that Stella’s 
reasonable agnosticism about conditionals renders her incapable of acquiring any justified beliefs 
on the basis of any evidence!  
Why does robust ATIJ fail?  That is, why can’t we read conclusions about robust 
propositional justification from Bayesian results?   The problem is that Bayesianism abstracts 
from reasoning-directed evidence.  So while Bayesianism reveals relations of object-directed 
evidence, it does not reveal much about robust propositional justification.  That is why, for 
instance, Bayesianism says everyone should assign logical truths—even complex ones—
probability 1.  The evidence that makes it, in practice, irrational to be so confident in logical 
truths is reasoning-directed evidence: each of us knows that he makes logical errors from time to 
time.  
The failure of Bayesianism to take reasoning-directed evidence into account has 
implications beyond the implausible assumption of logical omniscience.  One of Bayesianism’s 
two central claims is that we should update our credences via conditionalization: that is, Pr(p) 
upon learning that E should equal one’s prior Pr(p|E).  However, this rule of updating fails as a 
recipe for responding to reasoning-directed evidence.  Consider Detective Smith again, and call 
the evidence in his case E.  Before conducting his investigation, he might correctly reason that: 
 
Pr(the butler did it|E)=Pr(the butler did it|E and Smith is an unreliable detective) 
    
since whether Smith is an unreliable detective does not bear at all on whether the butler did it.  
Later, Smith learns that E, and becomes confident that indeed the butler did it.  Later still, Smith 
learns that he is an unreliable detective and lowers, somewhat, his confidence that the butler did 
it.  All of this seems appropriate.  But note that Smith has violated the rule of updating his 
credences via conditionalization.  That rule would require his confidence that the butler did it to 
remain unchanged when he learns that he is an unreliable detective.  But Smith is surely right to 
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violate the rule: it would be unreasonable for him not to lower his confidence that the butler did 
it in light of his new evidence.  So, reasoning-directed evidence generates counterexamples to the 
principle that one’s credence in a proposition upon acquiring some total body of evidence should 
equal the prior epistemic probability of that proposition conditional upon having that total body 
of evidence.21  The rule that you ought to update via conditionalization is plausible as a claim 
about how to respond to new object-directed evidence, it is a poor guide to how we ought to 
respond to new reasoning-directed evidence.  Bayesianism is thus best thought of as a guide to 
object-directed support; it is just silent on reasoning-directed evidence.  We cannot use 
Bayesianism as a guide to robust propositional justification. 
So the robust version of ATIJ, like Robust Conservatism, yields obviously false 
conclusions in cases involving reasoning-directed defeat.  What about anemic ATIJ?  Anemic 
ATIJ may well be true – the Failed Logician is no counterexample to it, and indeed I am unable 
to think of any counterexamples.  Moreover, the Bayesian results above show that someone can 
only acquire justified beliefs on the basis of perception if he already has adequate object-directed 
evidence to believe I am not a deceived BIV.  So if we think of anemic propositional justification 
for p as having a lot of object-directed evidence for p, anemic ATIJ has got to be correct.  As a 
result, all non-skeptics should learn to live with some anemic form of rationalism: it follows 
from the above Bayesian results and anemic ATIJ.  But anemic ATIJ, combined with the 
Bayesian results above, will only yield an argument for Anemic Conservatism.  As we’ve seen, 
that’s no threat to Mooreanism.  So the Bayesian considerations do not tell us what is wrong with 
Moore’s proof.  They do, however, suggest that the picture fleshed out in parts 4 through 6—
wherein Moorean reasoning can be fine, but we might need to learn to live with anemic 
rationalism—is correct.   
 
                                                
21 David Christensen makes this argument in his unpublished manuscript “Higher-Order Evidence”. 
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2.8 CONCLUSION: REASONING-DIRECTED DEFEAT AND AGNOSTICISM 
 
The upshot of my argument is that the Achilles heel of the conservative response to Mooreanism 
lies in a surprising place: an ambiguity about whether having propositional justification entails 
the existence of a sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from one’s evidence to the proposition in 
question.  It’s easy to see how this problem could remain invisible.  It is tempting to assume that 
the following two claims are equivalent: 
 
1. S has adequate evidence that bears on whether ~U  
 
2. There is some sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from S’s evidence to the conclusion 
that ~U.   
 
But—crucially—this isn’t quite right.  Whether there is a sound deliberative route from 
someone’s evidence to ~U depends, in large part, upon her reasoning-directed evidence, whereas 
whether someone has adequate evidence that bears on whether ~U depends solely upon her 
object-directed evidence.  These two ways of spelling out propositional justification to believe 
that ~U are not equivalent.  Yet only when we conflate them is the conservative diagnosis of 
Mooreanism tenable: either disambiguation yields a version of conservatism that can’t make 
trouble for Mooreans.   
This approach to Mooreanism leaves two questions.  First: I’ve identified a type of 
case—involving reasoning-directed defeat for anti-underminers—where all parties should agree 
that Moorean reasoning is a way to acquire justification.  Should we think of these cases as a 
sideshow to the central debate over Mooreanism, or rather accept that the debate over 
Mooreanism turns out to be just a debate about reasoning-directed defeat?  My answer is that we 
ought to take the latter position: the debate over reasoning-directed defeat is the main event.  The 
first sort of reason to adopt this position is that it allows Mooreans to avoid biting any bullets.  It 
explains, in a non-ad hoc manner, why Moorean reasoning in cases such as Moore 1-3 and 
Induction 1-3 is kosher while allegedly Moorean reasoning in odious cases such as Table 1-3 and 
Election 1-3 is not.  We thus get a response to skeptics without any objectionable “easy 
justification”.  Moreover, it offers a neat reply to the Bayesian objection to Mooreanism that 
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turns on an independently recognized failure of Bayesianism to account for reasoning-directed 
defeat.   
Thus the stance that Mooreanism just is a doctrine about the rational response to 
reasoning-directed defeat avoids the problems widely believed to tar all Moorean views.  
However, this stance gives rise to a second question: isn’t this a really astonishing place for the 
conservative response to Mooreanism to falter?  Alternately: how on earth could a debate about a 
pattern of anti-skeptical reasoning and a debate about the rational response to a type of defeater 
boil down to the same thing?  Answering this question requires a close look at rational 
agnosticism.  Conservatives and liberals, recall from part 2, disagree only about how to rationally 
respond to agnosticism about underminers: that much is old news.  Most discussions of 
liberalism and conservatism proceed as if it’s just obvious what sort of agnosticism is at issue.  
But it is quite difficult to articulate just what sort of agnosticism about underminers is relevant to 
the disagreement between liberals and conservatives - and impossible to do so without invoking 
reasoning-directed defeat. 
Many possible senses of “agnosticism” are obviously not relevant to the disagreement 
between liberals and conservatives.  One type of agnosticism is simply failing to form an attitude 
about a proposition because you’ve never thought about whether it is true.  But everyone agrees 
that people do not need to have ocurrent beliefs that the relevant anti-underminers are false, so 
this sort of agnosticism cannot be the relevant kind.  A second kind of agnosticism occurs when 
someone lacks the conceptual capacities to entertain a proposition – but this, too, is obviously 
not the kind of agnosticism at issue.  A third kind of rational agnosticism is having a bunch of 
evidence both for and against a proposition, where the two sides have exactly equal weight.  But 
that is properly called indifference rather than agnosticism, and in any case doesn’t describe our 
position vis-à-vis skeptical hypotheses.   
These familiar options do not exhaust the ways in which someone can be rationally 
agnostic about a proposition.  Another way is to have reasoning-directed evidence which 
suggests that you are in no position to figure out whether the proposition is true.  Consider 
Detective Smith again.  He may have evidence that the butler did it, and he certainly has 
bothered to think about whether the butler did it, but he should be agnostic about whether the 
butler did it: not because he lacks sufficient object-directed evidence that the butler did it, but 
because he rationally ought to lack confidence in his ability to figure out the force of that 
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evidence.  It’s precisely this sort of rational agnosticism that generates the problem cases for 
conservatism: all of the counterexamples to Robust Conservatism in part 4 involve this kind of 
agnosticism.   
This final type of agnosticism describes our position vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios, at least 
prior to engaging in Moorean reasoning: maybe we have adequate object-directed evidence to 
just write them off, but none of us ought to be very confident in his ability to figure out which 
deeply contingent propositions are true using reason alone.22  After all, skeptics do not call our 
knowledge of the relevant anti-underminers into doubt by producing object-directed evidence 
against those anti-underminers – skeptics do not produce one iota of evidence that you are in fact 
a brain in a vat or that induction will suddenly become unreliable in the near future.  They do 
not—or at least should not—argue that none of us has any evidence that skeptical hypotheses are 
false: maybe it is just impossible to run a computer powerful enough to deceive a brain into 
having experiences like mine, so my experiences are evidence that I am not a deceived brain in a 
vat.  What skeptics do instead is call into question whether any of us is in a position to 
determine, on the basis of his evidence, whether those anti-underminers are true: maybe my 
evidence is inconsistent with my being a brain in a vat, but I am in no position to tell whether it 
is.  Skeptics sow reasoning-directed defeat.   
So it is no surprise that thinking carefully about reasoning-directed defeat reveals a 
problem with the conservative objection to Mooreanism: we cannot properly formulate what 
liberals and conservatives disagree about without discussing it.  Moorean reasoning is nothing 
more than a tool for getting around agnosticism generated by reasoning-directed defeat.  In our 
day-to-day lives, we do not need any such tools.  When responding to skeptics, though, Moorean 
reasoning is just what we need.  
 
                                                
22 Is there another species of agnosticism: lacking any object-directed evidence, or more generally, adequate object-
directed evidence, for or against a proposition?  I think this is just a species of the sort of agnosticism I am 
discussing.  How much object-directed evidence counts as adequate depends upon your reasoning-directed 
evidence: Detective Smith and Sherlock Holmes require different levels of object-directed evidence in order to have 
justification to believe that the butler did it.  So this final type of agnosticism is not having enough object-directed 
evidence to clear the bar that your reasoning-directed evidence says you must clear in order to have justification to 
believe a proposition.   
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3.0  RATIONALIST RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM: A NEW PUZZLE 
Skeptical arguments focus on “bad” scenarios – situations where the world is not as we believe.  
There are lots and lots of ways for reality to fail to match my beliefs: why have a tiny handful of 
such “bad” scenarios achieved notoriety?  For instance, I believe that I have hands.  There are 
many “bad” scenarios where I don’t, but some are a great deal more troubling than others.  
Compare a notorious “bad” hypothesis: 
 
Brain in a Vat (BIV): I am a recently envatted brain being fed deceptive 
sensations that mimic perception 
 
with a rather less troubling one: 
Stumps: everything is as I believe it to be, except that there are no hands on the 
end of my arms 
 
I don’t have hands in either scenario, but only the first scenario is apt to generate a skeptical 
attack on my justification to believe that I have hands.  Why?  Roughly, because according to a 
skeptic armed with Stumps, perception works just fine – so I can trust my faculty of perception 
to tell me whether or not there are hands on the ends of my arms.  BIV doesn’t just say that I 
don’t have hands, it also gives me reason to doubt that perception—the method I would normally 
use to check whether I have hands—can be trusted.  BIV defeats the method I need to check 
whether I have hands.  Similarly, compare the notorious: 
 
Non-Uniform World (NUW): the laws of nature will suddenly change tomorrow 
 
with the tame: 
Gloomy: everything is as I normally believe it to be, except that the sun won’t rise 
tomorrow. 
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If either hypothesis is true, I can’t know that the sun will rise tomorrow.  Gloomy will not help to 
generate a worrying skeptical attack, though.  The reason why not is that it is easy to see how I 
can know that it doesn’t obtain: easily accessible astronomical data and basic physics allow me 
to figure out that the sun will, indeed, rise tomorrow.  Of course, the same astronomical data and 
physical laws entail that NUW is false, too.  However NUW is more worrying because it entails 
that precisely the law-based inductive inference that I’d normally use to figure out that the sun 
will rise tomorrow can’t be trusted.  What separates the nasty hypothesis from the tame ones 
isn’t that they entail the falsity of some of my ordinary beliefs (I have hands, the sun will rise 
tomorrow).  Both nasty and tame hypotheses do that.  Rather, what separates the nasty 
hypotheses is that they also entail that the sort of reasoning I would use to figure out whether the 
hypotheses themselves are true are untrustworthy across the board.  
How should we respond to the notorious skeptical hypotheses? One way is to give in and 
say that we can’t form justified beliefs that that BIV and NUW are false.  That concessive 
response is unappealing, so let’s set it aside for now. Non-concessive lines of response fall into 
two major camps: the division between the two camps centers on how, exactly, we ought to think 
of the relation between notorious and tame skeptical hypotheses.   
The first camp says we ought to treat the notorious skeptical hypotheses just like the tame 
ones.  How do I know that Stumps is false?  I can see that I have hands – so there are hands, not 
stumps, on the end of my arms.  How do I know that BIV is false?  I can see that I have hands – 
so I’m an embodied person, not a brain-in-a-vat.  Similarly, I have lots of inductive evidence that 
the laws of nature won’t suddenly change tomorrow: they’ve always remained constant in the 
past, after all.  Call responses in this camp Moorean, since they recall G. E. Moore’s notorious 
“proof” of an external world.  Moorean responses seem fishy: by relying on the very ways of 
acquiring justification that the skeptical scenarios call into question, these replies seem 
unresponsive or question-begging.  They appear to ignore the plain fact that the notorious 
skeptical hypotheses are nastier than the tame ones. 
The second non-concessive camp grants skeptics that our normal ways of forming beliefs 
about our surrounding or about the future won’t cut any ice against the notorious hypotheses.  
But members of the second camp stop short of saying we have no way at all of forming justified 
beliefs that notorious skeptical hypotheses are false: they adopt the rationalist position that we 
can form justified beliefs apriori—that is, beliefs not based on any evidence—that skeptical 
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scenarios such as BIV and NUW are false.  Indeed, many rationalists believe that the notorious 
hypotheses show what we must take for granted in order to be in the business of forming beliefs 
about the world – we can’t reason our way to the conclusion that they are false because their 
falsity is a presupposition of reasoning at all.23 
One very common sort of worry about rationalism is that it is mysterious: how could 
there be the sort of apriori justification that it requires?  BIV and NUW are deeply contingent 
propositions, so the rationalist story requires deeply contingent apriori justification – many 
philosophers who accept apriori justification for beliefs about necessary claims will balk at 
apriori justification for beliefs about deeply contingent claims24.  The latter sort of justification 
seems weird: how do we get it?  Of course, anyone trying to land this attack will need to make it 
a lot more precise, but it is hard not to sympathize with the thought that we can’t get justified 
beliefs in deeply contingent claims for free. 
I’d like to focus, instead, on a second worry about rationalism: that it just pushes the 
skeptical problem back.  A clever skeptic wielding BIV or NUW should, if faced with a 
rationalist reply, just trot out another skeptical hypothesis: 
 
The Very Manipulative Neuroscientist (VMN): I am a recently envatted brain 
and a neuroscientist is manipulating my faculties of reason in ways that make it 
seem to me that I have apriori justification to believe false, deeply contingent 
propositions for which I do not, in fact, have apriori justification. 
 
VMN appears to stand toward apriori reasoning as BIV stands to perception and NUW stands to 
induction: it defeats the very method of forming beliefs that we’d need to use to show it is false.  
It’s a nasty skeptical hypothesis.  If a skeptic can use VMN to remove our apriori justification for 
deeply contingent propositions then he can use VMN to remove our apriori justification for not-
BIV and not-NUW.  An inability to respond to a skeptic wielding VMN renders rationalism 
impotent as an anti-skeptical strategy.  What should a rationalist say about how anyone is able to 
acquire a justified belief in not-VMN?  Saying that we can use apriori reasoning to determine 
                                                
23 For an eloquent defense of this position, see Wright (1985), (2002), (2004), and (2008) as well as White (2006).  
24 A proposition is superficially necessary if it is necessary because of the way that the reference of some term is 
fixed; it is superficially contingent if it is not superficially necessary. In contrast, a proposition is deeply contingent 
if there are some possible worlds in which a state of affairs that makes it true obtains and others where no such state 
of affairs obtains.  The origin of this distinction is Evans (2000). 
 For a defense of deeply contingent apriori justification, see Hawthorne (2002).   
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that VMN is false looks non-responsive or question-begging in just the same way that using 
induction to argue that NUW is false or citing perceptual evidence that BIV is false seem non-
responsive or question-begging.  Rationalism thus seems to lose the big advantage it had over 
Mooreanism: its promise to refute skepticism without just begging the question against skeptics.  
Call this claim the Same Boat Hypothesis.  The Same Boat Hypothesis creates a dilemma for 
fans of rationalism as an anti-skeptical strategy.  If question-begging replies are no good, then a 
skeptic armed with VMN wins.  If question-begging replies are okay, it’s not clear why we need 
rationalism in the first place: we should become Mooreans and be done with it.  Either way, 
rationalism fails as an anti-skeptical alternative to Mooreanism: either both strategies fail (so the 
skeptic wins) or rationalism can defeat skeptics but so can Mooreanism.   
This second worry is far more damning than the first.  The first worry doubts that we 
have the sort of apriori justification that rationalists insist on.  The second worry says that even if 
we grant rationalists all that they ask—apriori justification to believe in the falsity of deeply 
contingent skeptical hypotheses—it isn’t enough to defeat skeptics without making Moorean 
inferences.  Rationalism, absent Moorean inference, doesn’t work as an anti-skeptical strategy 
even if it is true.  As far as I can tell, this second worry has received no attention in the literature 
on skepticism.   
My aims in this paper are twofold: first, to determine whether rationalism and 
Mooreanism are in the same boat when it comes to circularity; second, to determine whether that 
boat is a bad one to be in.  My comments so far have been imprecise: if we are going to get 
straight about whether there is a real problem for rationalism here, we will need to say a lot more 
about exactly what question-begging means in this context.  The next part of this paper will 
present skeptical challenges centered on BIV, NUW, and VMN more carefully.  Part II will pose 
the question of what, exactly, is viciously circular or question-begging about Moorean responses 
to skepticism.  Parts III, IV, and V will lay out three possible ways to make this charge of 
circularity more precise.  Each of these attempts will fail in two ways.  First, each will fail to 
give a principled account of why the alleged constraint on reasoning that rules out Mooreanism 
does not also rule out the rationalist response to a skeptic wielding VMN – that is, each will 
entail the Same Boat Hypothesis.  Second, each will fail to point out a plausible general 
constraint on reasoning that is violated by Moorean responses to skepticism – each will show 
that the boat shared by Mooreanism and rationalism is a fine one to be in.  I conclude that the 
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dilemma posed above succeeds: rationalism and Mooreanism are in the same boat, so rationalism 
is not an anti-skeptical alternative to Mooreanism.  Does this mean that rationalism is false?  
Certainly not; it just means that rationalists are in no position to condemn Moorean reasoning as 
unacceptably circular.  This result defeats an influential argument in favor of rationalism—
namely, that it’s the only plausible alternative to skepticism—but does not give any affirmative 
reason to believe that rationalism is false.  Indeed, I am not at all sure that anyone—Mooreans 
included—should reject rationalism entirely.  In the final part of the paper I’ll argue that we 
shouldn’t think of Mooreanism and rationalism as rivals, but rather as compatible—and possibly 
complementary—theories about different things.   
3.1 RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM  
 
How, exactly, is a skeptic supposed to use BIV to threaten our ordinary perceptual knowledge?   
A common way to present the skeptic’s argument is: 
 
Premise: (Simple-1) I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV  
Premise: (Simple-2) If I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV then I do not 
have justification to believe that I have hands 
Therefore: (Simple-3) I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
 
It is not clear that anyone should lose sleep over this argument.  The first premise is itself a 
skeptical conclusion, and hardly something that most people accept pre-philosophically.  So it 
looks like we are free to reject it without further ado.  Yet without Simple-1, skeptics cannot 
make any mischief with this style of argument.   
Skeptics can do better.  A stronger argument in the same neighborhood—one that doesn’t 
assert that I lack justification to believe that not-BIV by fiat—is available: 
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Premise: (Nasty-1) Either I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV or I do have 
justification to believe it, but my justification depends (at least in part) on beliefs justified 
by perception 
Premise: (Nasty-2) If I have justification to believe any proposition on the basis of 
perception, then I must have independent (of perception) justification to believe that not-
BIV 
So: (Nasty-3) I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV 
Premise: (Nasty-4) If I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV then I do not 
have justification to believe that I have hands 
Therefore: (Nasty-5) I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
 
The third step of this argument follows from the first two because Nasty-1 says that any 
justification I have to believe that not-BIV depends upon perception, while Nasty-2 says that 
justification to believe anything on the basis of perception requires perception-independent 
justification to believe that not-BIV.  More simply, Nasty-1 says that justification to believe that 
not-BIV could only come from perception, while Nasty-2 says that justification to believe that 
not-BIV cannot come from perception.  Nasty-3 follows because there is nowhere left for 
justification for not-BIV to come from.25   
It’s worth saying a bit about the notion of dependence that figures in this argument.  
What I have in mind here is not a kind of psychological dependence—this argument does not 
turn on a claim about the psychological process wherein someone forms a belief that not-BIV—
but rather on rational dependence.  A belief that p rationally depends on perception just in case 
were I to learn that my faculties of perception were totally unreliable, I would lose my 
justification to believe that p.   
The situation regarding inductive skepticism is analogous.  Consider a familiar sort of 
argument:  
 
Premise: (Simple Induction-1) I do not have justification to believe not-NUW 
Premise: (Simple Induction-2) If I do not have justification to believe that not-NUW 
then I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow 
Therefore: (Simple Induction-3) I do not have justification to believe that the sun will 
rise tomorrow 
 
                                                
25 My discussion of the superiority of Nasty 1-5 to Simple 1-3 follows Pryor (2000).   
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Non-skeptics can comfortably deny Simple Induction-1, so this argument isn’t very powerful.  
The more worrying argument is: 
 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-1) Either I do not have justification to believe that not-NUW 
or I do have justification to believe it, but my justification depends (at least in part) on 
beliefs justified by induction 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-2) If I have justification to believe any proposition about the 
future on the basis of induction, then I must have independent (of induction) justification 
to believe that not-NUW 
So: (Nasty Induction-3) I do not have justification to believe that not-NUW 
Premise: (Nasty Induction-4) If I do not have justification to believe that not-NUW then 
I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
Therefore: (Nasty-5) I do not have justification to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow 
 
Where, again, the relevant dependence is rational dependence.  There is no premise here that 
non-skeptics can flatly reject, so once again the nasty argument is far more effective than its 
simple counterpart. 
How might we resist Nasty 1-5 and Nasty-Induction 1-5?  Each argument has three 
premises, and thus three possible loci of resistance.  One way out is to deny the fourth step of 
each argument, and say e.g. that I do not have justification to believe that not-BIV but do have 
justification to believe that I have hands.  The trouble here is that brains in vats don’t have hands, 
so I have hands entails not-BIV.  Thus this strategy involves denying closure—the thesis that if 
someone has justification to believe that p, and p entails q, and he forms a belief that q based on 
p, then his belief that q must be justified—since if closure were true, anyone with justification to 
believe that he has hands would have justification to believe not-BIV.  Denying closure is a 
radical move indeed, so from now on I’ll proceed on the assumption that closure is true.26   
A second locus of resistance is the first premise of each argument, which says that if I 
have justification to believe not-BIV, that justification depends upon perceptual beliefs, and if I 
have justification to believe not-NUW, that justification depends upon inductive beliefs.  These 
premises do not say that the justification in question must come from perception or induction 
alone: rather, they claim that knowledge of my surroundings must depend, at one stage or 
another, on beliefs justified by perception and that knowledge of the future must depend, at one 
                                                
26 An adequate defense of closure would take us far afield.  For an argument for closure, see Hawthorne (2005).   
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stage or another, on beliefs justified by induction.  Even so, rationalists deny both of these 
premises since they insist that we have apriori justification for not-BIV and not-NUW – and this 
apriori justification in no way depends upon perceptual or inductive beliefs.  So rationalists can 
resist the first premise of each argument, but everyone else looks stuck with it.   
The final locus of resistance is the second premise of each nasty argument: the claim that 
using perception to acquire justification requires independent (of perception) justification to 
believe not-BIV, and using induction to acquire justification requires independent (of induction) 
justification to believe not-NUW.  This premise is an anti-circularity requirement: it says you 
cannot acquire justification to believe anything on the basis of perception unless you have 
justification to believe not-BIV—that much follows from closure—and that, moreover, you 
cannot acquire justification to believe not-BIV for the first time by using perception: that is, you 
cannot reason here is a hand (I perceive as much) therefore not-BIV; Nasty Induction-2 rules out 
the analogous inductive case for not-NUW.  The second premise of each argument, then, rules 
out the sort of circularity involved in Moorean reasoning.   
We can now state our worry about rationalism more carefully.  Suppose a rationalist 
rejects Mooreanism—and thus embraces Nasty-2 and Nasty Induction-2—and also embraces 
closure, and thus embraces Nasty-4 and Nasty Induction-4.  That rationalist looks ill-positioned 
to respond to: 
 
Premise: (Manipulative-1) Either I do not have justification to believe that not-VMN or I 
do have justification to believe it, but my justification is depends (at least in part) on 
beliefs justified by perception or I do have justification to believe it, but my justification 
comes from apriori reasoning 
Premise: (Manipulative-2a) If I have justification to believe any proposition on the basis 
of perception, then I must have independent (of perception) justification to believe that 
not-VMN 
Premise: (Manipulative-2b): If I have justification to believe anything on the basis of 
apriori reasoning, then I must have independent (of apriori reasoning) justification to 
believe that not-VMN 
So: (Manipulative-3) I do not have justification to believe that not-VMN 
Premise: (Manipulative-4) If I do not have justification to believe that not-VMN then I 
do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
Therefore: (Manipulative-5) I do not have justification to believe that I have hands 
 
Rationalism gives no grounds to reject the first premise, anti-circularity considerations seem to 
require accepting premises 2a and 2b, and closure requires accepting premise 4.  So, rationalists 
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face a problem here.  The only way out is to treat Manipulative-2b as different from all of the 
other second premises: that is, to say that while the Moorean response to BIV and the inductive 
response to NUW are viciously circular, using apriori reasoning to defeat VMN is acceptably 
circular.  The Same Boat Hypothesis alleges the opposite, namely that any grounds for rejecting 
Manipulative-2b will also be grounds for rejecting Nasty-2 and Nasty Induction-2.   
Some rationalists may question the first premises by insisting that justification to believe 
not-VMN is had by default and thus does not depend on anything, including apriori reasoning.  
If default justification is justification that does not require one to have gone through any 
psychological process of reasoning, then the claim that not-VMN has default justification doesn’t 
matter much for our purposes.  Nothing in Manipulative 1-5 turns on the process whereby 
anyone comes to believe not-VMN: the argument turns instead on claims about rational 
dependence.  However, if default justification means justification that cannot be undercut—that 
is, justification such that there is no claim U such that, were I to learn U, my justification would 
diminish—then justification to believe not-VMN cannot be default.  Imagine I came to know that 
I had been brainwashed: some nefarious experimental philosophers, as part of their research, 
deliberately and extensively tampered with my faculties of apriori reasoning (including my 
reasoning about which propositions are apriori).    Learning that really ought to diminish my 
confidence in putative apriori claims, including (if I believe it to be apriori) not-VMN.  So not-
VMN cannot be default in the second, stronger sense: justification to believe it requires a 
shakable trust in my faculties of apriori reasoning.  So insisting on default justification won’t 
derail the first premise in any significant way.   
Getting straight on whether rationalists can reject Manipulative-2b without rejecting all 
of the other second premises, though, will require a closer examination of just what the anti-
circularity constraint involves.  So far we’ve just gestured roughly at some constraint that rules 
out Moorean inferences such as justifying not-BIV by using perceptual beliefs.  We’re going to 
need to pin this constraint down precisely before we can figure out whether it makes trouble for 
rationalists faced with VMN as well. 
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3.2 WHY NOT BE A MOOREAN? 
 
What is wrong with Moorean reasoning?  So far we have gestured in the direction of a problem 
by saying that Moorean reasoning is circular or question-begging, but this is far too imprecise.  
Consider: 
 
Enabling condition27: (Moore-1) [an experience as of a hand] 
So: (Moore-2) I have a hand 
Therefore: (Moore-3) not-BIV 
 
Premise: (Moorean Induction-1) In the past, observed regularities have tended to 
continue into the future 
So: (Moorean Induction-2) From now on, observed regularities will tend to continue into 
the future 
Therefore: (Moorean Induction-3) not-NUW 
   
Moorean reasoning does not beg the question in the typical sense of being tautological: the 
conclusions of Moorean reasoning are not among the premises.  So circularity in that sense 
cannot be what is wrong with these bits of reasoning.  None of this is to deny that these pieces of 
reasoning seem fishy, but what, exactly, is wrong with them? 
There are a few other bad diagnoses.  A first bad diagnosis is to deny the first step of each 
argument, i.e. to say that in the past observed regularities have not tended to continue into the 
future, or to say that nobody ever does have a perceptual experience as of a hand.  That reply 
lacks any plausibility.  A second bad reply is to deny that any of us ever has justification to 
believe the second step of each argument on the basis of the first.  But that’s an awfully drastic 
measure: we’d like a diagnosis of these arguments that does not commit us to wholesale 
skepticism about perceptual beliefs.  Third, we could deny that anyone can infer the conclusion 
from the second step.  However, in each case the second step deductively entails the conclusion, 
so this move requires denying closure; that, too, is an unappealing option.  Can’t we do better? 
                                                
27 I say “enabling condition” rather than “premise” since having some perceptual experience cannot itself be a 
premise in an argument (though, of course, the proposition I am having a perceptual experience as of a hand could 
be).  By enabling condition I simply mean a state that licenses the formation of another belief, here via the use of 
perception.   
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Yes – in the next three sections I will look at three accounts that have some go in them.  
All three of these accounts will allege that Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 are 
counterexamples to transmission: the thesis that if you have justification to believe the premises 
of a bit of reasoning (or: are in fact in the enabling conditions for that bit of reasoning) and the 
premises or enabling conditions entail the conclusion, you can acquire additional justification to 
believe the conclusion by going through the bit of reasoning.  That is, the diagnosis will say that 
someone cannot acquire additional justification—or, justification for the first time—to believe 
not-BIV by going through Moore 1-3, nor can someone acquire justification to believe not-NUW 
by going through Moorean Induction 1-3.  These bits of reasoning exhibit transmission failure.   
If the Same Boat Hypothesis is false, two things need to be true.  First, there must be 
some plausible constraint on reasoning that entails Nasty-2 and Nasty Induction-2; in order to do 
this, it must entail that Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 cannot possibly give one 
justification to believe their conclusions.  That is, we need a story about why Moore 1-3 and 
Moorean Induction 1-3 exhibit transmission failure.  Second, this constraint on reasoning must 
not entail Manipulative-2b, on pain of defeating both Mooreanism and rationalism as anti-
skeptical strategies.  Obviously this second task is easy if we allow rationalists to put some ad 
hoc provisos in the relevant diagnosis: most egregiously, we can always attach a rider “…except 
when the skeptical scenario is VMN” to our constraint and get rationalism out of trouble.  The 
challenge is rather to motivate a constraint wherein there is a plausible, non-ad hoc story about 
why Moorean reasoning is circular and rationalist responses to VMN are not that entails Nasty-2 
and Nasty Induction-2 but not Manipulative-2a.   
 
3.3 FIRST DIAGNOSIS: INSENSITIVITY 
 
The first diagnosis begins with a simple observation: were BIV true, I would still have 
experiences as of hands.  Similarly, were NUW true, induction would still have a good track 
record.  Thus I could go through Moore 1-3 or Moorean Induction 1-3 even in “bad” worlds 
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where skeptical hypotheses hold.  This seems to make Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 
suspect at best.  After all, we wouldn’t trust a DNA test if we knew that it would say some blood 
was Smith’s even if it wasn’t: the possibility of a false positive might be tolerable, but certainty 
of a false positive would not!  Yet that’s just what Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 give 
us: it is certain that, were I in a “bad” world, I would be able to go through the reasoning Moore 
1-3 or Moorean Induction 1-3 and thereby arrive at a false conclusion.     
A little more carefully: call S’s belief that p sensitive iff were it the case that ~p, S would 
not believe that p (and a belief is insensitive if it is not sensitive).  A tempting position is: 
 
The sensitivity constraint on justification: If S knows that her belief that p is not 
sensitive, then her belief that p is not justified. 
 
Note that this position is rather less ambitious than the claim that S knows that p just in case her 
belief that p is sensitive: it says only that known insensitivity is inconsistent with justification.  If 
the sensitivity constraint on justification is true, any reasoning that we know to reach an 
insensitive conclusion without starting from any insensitive premises must fail to transmit 
justification to its conclusion.  Yet Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 have just this feature.  
Moore 1-3 has no premises—and thus no insensitive premises—whereas Moorean Induction 1-3 
has only the premise in the past, observed regularities have tended to continue into the future, 
and that belief is sensitive: were it false, I would not believe that it was true.  Yet we know that 
the conclusions of both arguments are insensitive.  Thus, we can condemn both Moorean 
arguments as failing to transmit justification.  Call this the insensitivity diagnosis.   
 The insensitivity diagnosis turns on three features of skeptical arguments:   
1. Our ordinary, humdrum beliefs tend to be sensitive: if I didn’t have hands, I wouldn’t 
believe that I did and if the past had been wildly irregular, I wouldn’t believe that it was 
mostly regular.   
2. Our beliefs in the negations of notorious skeptical hypotheses such as BIV and NUW are 
known to be insensitive. In contrast, our beliefs in the negations of tame skeptical 
hypotheses, not-Stumps and not-Gloomy, are sensitive.  If I had stumps on the end of my 
arms, I’d see that I didn’t have hands; if astronomical laws gave reasons to think the sun 
wouldn’t rise tomorrow, it’d be all over the news. 
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3. There are entailment relations between ordinary propositions and skeptical hypotheses.  
For instance, if I have hands then not-BIV.  Sensitivity is not closed under entailment: p 
can entail q, where p is sensitive, and yet q is insensitive.   
These three features create a puzzle: most of us want to accept closure, yet most of us 
(initially, anyway) find something like the sensitivity constraint on justification plausible.  It’s 
hard to know how to resolve this tension.   
This puzzle accounts for a lot of our schizophrenia about skeptical arguments.  Mooreans 
resolve this tension one way: our (sensitive) ordinary beliefs are justified, and our ordinary 
beliefs entail the falsity of skeptical hypotheses, so by closure we can form justified beliefs in the 
falsity of skeptical hypotheses.  Skeptics resolve it the other way: our (obviously insensitive) 
beliefs in the falsity of skeptical hypotheses are unjustified, yet our ordinary beliefs entail the 
falsity of those skeptical hypotheses, so by closure our ordinary beliefs must not be justified.  A 
third way to resolve this tension is, of course, to keep the sensitivity constraint and just give up 
closure: this allows maintaining both that our ordinary beliefs are justified and that our beliefs in 
the negations of skeptical hypotheses are not.28  
As an account of our intuitions about skeptical arguments, the insensitivity diagnosis has 
a lot going for it.  However, fans of the Same Boat Hypothesis cannot embrace the insensitivity 
diagnosis of what’s wrong with Mooreanism for two reasons.  First, it requires the sensitivity 
constraint on justification, yet as we have seen that account is hard to square with closure. Giving 
up closure is a very high price to pay.  Second, though, the insensitivity diagnosis won’t give us 
what we are after: a position that rejects the Same Boat Hypothesis.  According to the 
insensitivity diagnosis, the rationalist response to VMN is circular in just the same way as 
Moorean reasoning.  Belief in not-VMN is insensitive, so the insensitivity diagnosis condemns 
any reasoning that alleges to lead to a justified belief in VMN.  Put another way, since apriori 
reasoning to not-VMN has no insensitive premises but an insensitive conclusion, the insensitivity 
diagnosis must condemn it as bad reasoning.  Thus, fans of the insensitivity diagnosis are 
committed to Manipulative-2b.  The insensitivity diagnosis does not pick out a kind of circularity 
                                                
28 Nozick (1981) defends the sensitivity account of knowledge and adopts this third strategy (adapted to focus on 
knowledge, rather than justification): that is, he denies closure and thus claims that he knows that he has hands but 
does not know that not-BIV.    
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involved in Moorean arguments that does not also appear in the rationalist reply to VMN.  Our 
first attempt has failed.   
 
3.4 SECOND DIAGNOSIS: A DIALECTICAL CONSTRAINT 
 
Most people are inclined to say that Moorean reasoning “begs the question” against skeptics, 
though as we have seen Moorean arguments, unlike other “question-begging” arguments, aren’t 
tautological.  However, etymologically “begging the question” has nothing to do with tautologies 
– rather, it refers to arguing in a way that just asks (i.e. begs) one’s opponent to grant one’s 
conclusion, rather than earning the conclusion.  It is thus a dialectical no-no: a question-begging 
argument should not move someone who disagrees with you, and is thus unwilling to just grant 
your conclusion.  A second diagnosis of Moorean reasoning is that it commits just this sort of 
dialectical foul.  A little more carefully, we might embrace: 
 
No Question-Begging: A belief that p is justified only if it rests upon reasoning that 
would have some dialectical weight against someone who believes that ~p.   
 
Where an argument has dialectical weight against someone if and only if it provides him with 
some reason to believe its conclusion.  It is easy enough to see why No Question-Begging makes 
trouble for Moorean reasoning.  Moore 1-3 has no dialectical weight against someone who 
believes BIV: he’ll deny, with perfect internal consistency, that Moore-1 provides any support 
for Moore-2.  Similarly, Moorean Induction 1-3 has no dialectical weight against someone who 
believes NUW.  Call this account of the problem with Moorean reasoning the dialectical 
inefficacy diagnosis.   
The dialectical inefficacy diagnosis is not new.  Jim Pryor cites it as the reason why 
Moorean reasoning seems to be bad reasoning.29  Pryor grants that Moorean reasoning is 
                                                
29 See Pryor (2004). 
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dialectically ineffective, and thinks that we all feel some intuitive pull towards No Question 
Begging.  However, he thinks No Question Begging is false: it relies on a conflation between the 
task of defending a position against a skeptic and justifying your beliefs to yourself.  Thus, No 
Question Begging can explain the sociological datum that a lot of people are uneasy with 
Moorean reasoning but cannot give a successful account wherein Moorean reasoning does not 
lend justification to its conclusions.  Of course, just pointing out that defending a belief against a 
skeptic and justifying it to oneself are different tasks is not enough to defeat No Question 
Begging, since it is plausible that the criteria for success in those two tasks cannot come very far 
apart.  A natural way to think of justifying a belief is to defend it against a possible skeptic in an 
imaginary dialogue.  If that’s right, No Question Begging does not rely on sloppy conflation, but 
rather an appealing view wherein justification to oneself and dialectical efficacy against others 
cannot come apart.  We cannot write the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis off without a fight.  
So the good news for rationalist anti-Mooreans is that the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis 
does indeed condemn Moorean arguments and has quite a bit of initial plausibility.  Moreover, 
while No Question Begging is similar to conservatism, it only comes into play when responding 
to skeptics: it thus does not lead to the quotidian counterexamples that make trouble for 
conservatism.  The bad news, though, is that it also spells trouble for rationalism.  The reason 
why is clear enough: nothing a rationalist can say will have any dialectical force against someone 
convinced of VMN.30  In particular, any claim that not-VMN is apriori will lack dialectical force.  
So the dialectical inefficacy account entails Manipulative-2b, and thus that Manipulative 1-5 is a 
sound argument.  The dialectical inefficacy diagnosis entails the Same Boat Hypothesis.   
This leaves us with a puzzle: the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis is extremely plausible, 
but it rules out all anti-skeptical strategies.  We’d better have a good reason for rejecting it.  One 
such reason is obvious: given a choice between accepting No Question Begging and skepticism, 
and rejecting No Question Begging and skepticism, the latter certainly seems the more appealing 
package.  While that reason may be convincing, it isn’t very enlightening: the case for No 
Question Begging seemed plausible enough, and it is natural to wonder where it went wrong.  
We need a plausible story about why the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis is false. 
                                                
30 This character—the fellow convinced of VMN—is not a familiar one in the philosophical bestiary.  However, he 
needn’t be very different from the more familiar (from the epistemology literature, anyway!) character who believes 
BIV.  The believer in VMN simply adds that it may seem as if it is apriori that not-BIV, but that this rational 
appearance cannot be trusted since, like perceptual appearances, it is the result of a deception.   
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Fortunately, we can get one.  No Question Begging models justification on argument 
against an opposing position, but skeptics of the sort who push BIV, NUW, or VMN aren’t really 
defending a position – at least, not if No Question Begging is correct.  Skeptics do not produce 
evidence or argument for BIV, NUW, or VMN.  No skeptic has any credible evidence that any of 
these bad scenarios hold.  That’s familiar enough: skeptical arguments do not proceed by 
providing reasons to believe skeptical hypotheses; they proceed by saying, first, that we lack 
conclusive grounds for believing the negation of skeptical hypotheses and second, that we 
therefore ought to be agnostic about them.  The problem is that if No Question Begging is true, 
and skeptics have no dialectically effective arguments in support of BIV, NUW, or VMN, then 
skeptics necessarily lack justification to believe those claims.  A skeptic who embraces BIV, 
NUW, or VMN is thus thereby unreasonable if No Question Begging is true: his belief lacks 
justification.  So if we imagine ourselves in an argument against such a skeptic, we ought to be 
able to shake him from his position just by mentioning No Question Begging!  If No Question 
Begging is right, reasonable skeptics embracing BIV, NUW, or VMN cannot exist.31 
This last point is important because if we are arguing with a skeptic who believes BIV, 
NUW, or VMN then we can, by invoking No Question Begging, get him to be agnostic about his 
favored skeptical hypothesis.  The question of whether, say, Moore 1-3 is good reasoning then 
becomes, according to No Question Begging: should Moore 1-3 make someone who is agnostic 
about BIV have justification to believe not-BIV?  But that’s just the same as our original 
question, namely: is Moore 1-3 good reasoning?  No Question-Begging thus gets us no closer to 
figuring out whether Moore 1-3 is good reasoning.  We can only make sense of dialectical 
weight in the context of argument against someone with an internally consistent position – yet if 
No Question-Begging is true then nobody with an internally consistent position can believe BIV, 
NUW, or VMN.  Once we’ve dislodged our dialectical opponent from his belief in BIV, NUW, 
or VMN can we then go on to give a Moorean argument?  That’s the question we’ve been 
worried about throughout, but No Question-Begging doesn’t look well-positioned to answer it.  
So the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis fails to tell us what is wrong with Moore 1-3 or Moorean 
Induction 1-3.  All it tells us is something we already knew: if there is a story about why those 
                                                
31 Of course, its possible that the skeptic with whom we are arguing does not accept No Question Begging.  Maybe, 
then, it is not unreasonable for him to hold not-BIV.  However, the point remains that we can condemn Moorean 
reasoning using No Question Begging only if we apply that constraint to ourselves but not to our skeptical opponent 
– and I just can’t see any motivation for this double standard.   
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bits of reasoning are no good, then those bits of reasoning are no good.  The charge of dialectical 
inefficacy adds nothing.   
 
3.5 THIRD DIAGNOSIS: CONSERVATISM 
 
Let’s set skepticism aside, for a moment, and consider some bad arguments about everyday 
matters: 
 
Premise: (Table-1) This table looks red 
So: (Table-2) This table is red 
Therefore: (Table-3) This is not a white table under red lights 
 
Premise: (Election-1) Someone just checked a box on a piece of paper and slid it into a 
slot 
So: (Election-2) Someone just voted 
Therefore: (Election-3) This is not just a rehearsal of an election 
 
These look like terrible bits of reasoning.  It should not be so easy to acquire justified beliefs in 
Table-3 or Election-3; if these arguments are not epistemically useless they generate odious 
“easy justification” for their conclusions.32  Yet, as before, it can be tricky to say what is wrong 
with each bit of reasoning: neither is tautological, and each step looks individually 
unobjectionable.  A plausible diagnosis is that the premise of each argument gives reason to 
believe the second step only on the assumption that the conclusion is true.  That the table looks 
red gives you reason to believe that it is red only on the assumption that the lights aren’t red; that 
someone put some paper in a ballot box gives you reason to believe that someone voted only on 
the assumption that there is an election going on.  A little more carefully, the negation of the 
conclusion of each argument is an underminer for the support lent by the first step to the 
second: a claim that, were you to learn it, would remove whatever rational force the first premise 
                                                
32 Cohen (2002) and Wright (2008) offer versions of this worry about Moorean reasoning; Cohen discusses easy 
knowledge, rather than easy justification, but the basic shape of the worry is the same. 
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lends to the second step of each argument.  Do you have justification to assume the conclusion of 
each argument?  Maybe yes, maybe no: if you’re in Ikea, it’s a safe bet that the lights are white, 
but if you’re in a fun house then all bets are off.  So if you’re in Ikea, you can reasonably go 
through the reasoning of Table 1-3, but if you’re in a fun house you may not.  Either way, you 
can rationally go through the steps of Table 1-3 only if you already have justification to believe 
Table-3; similarly, you can only rationally go through the steps of Election 1-3 if you already 
have justification to believe Election-3.  So while these arguments aren’t tautological, they are 
epistemically useless in just the same way that tautological arguments are.  Nobody can use them 
to acquire justification to believe anything new.   
We can generalize this account of the problem with Table 1-3 and Election 1-3.  Our 
diagnosis rested, implicitly, on a principle called conservatism: the claim that someone can 
acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of some grounds G only if he has antecedent 
justification to believe that all hypotheses that undermine the support lent by that consideration 
to p are false.  Conservatism says that someone has justification to believe Table-2 on the basis 
of Table-1 only if he already has justification to believe Table-3 (ditto for Election 1-3).  If 
conservatism is true, Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 are epistemically useless for just the 
same reason that Table 1-3 and Election 1-3 are.  A perceptual experience as of a hand gives me 
reason to believe I have a hand only if I may reasonably assume that not-BIV; induction having a 
good track record gives me reason to believe that induction will continue to be reliable only if I 
may reasonably assume not-NUW.  This diagnosis is appealing not only because conservatism 
looks compelling on its own, but because it seems to offer the right diagnosis of humdrum bad 
reasoning like Table 1-3 and Election 1-3.  Call this the conservative diagnosis. 
Does conservatism make the world safe for anti-Moorean rationalists: that is, does it 
entail Nasty-2, Nasty Induction-2, and Manipulative-2a, but not entail Manipulative-2b?   
The answer isn’t obvious.   Conservatism says I can form justified beliefs using 
perception only if I have antecedent justification to believe not-BIV and that I can form justified 
beliefs using induction only if I have antecedent justification to believe not-NUW.  Does it also 
say I can form justified beliefs using apriori reasoning only if I have antecedent justification to 
believe not-VMN?  If so, is there any reason to think that it doesn’t entail Manipulative-2b?  I 
can think of two possible reasons to think that conservatism doesn’t entail the Same Boat 
Hypothesis: 
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1. Restrict our notion of undermining. Perhaps evidential support can be undermined, 
but apriori rational support cannot.  If we understand the term “underminer” narrowly 
to mean a defeater than removes the support lent by some evidence to p, conservatism 
is silent on whether someone needs antecedent justification to believe not-VMN to 
form justified apriori beliefs. 
2. Restrict our notion of justification to believe.  We can distinguish stronger and 
weaker notions of justification to believe.  On a robust understanding someone has 
justification to believe that p only if there is a sound, undefeated deliberative route 
from his evidence concluding in a doxastically justified belief that p.  On that robust 
understanding, conservatism entails Manipulative-2b: it says someone can form 
justified beliefs on the basis of apriori reasoning only if he already has an undefeated 
sound deliberative route concluding in a justified belief that not-VMN. On a more 
anemic understanding, justification to believe that p only requires adequate evidence 
that p.  Since we’re granting rationalists that we don’t need any evidence to believe 
not-VMN, we’ve all got adequate evidence to believe that not-VMN and this in no 
way depends on any evidence or reasoning.  If conservatism is a claim about 
justification in the anemic sense—that is, if conservatism says you need adequate 
evidential support for ~U (where U is an underminer), but do not need to be able to 
reason your way to the conclusion that ~U, in order to form a justified belief that p on 
the basis of some grounds G—then conservatism does not entail Manipulative-2b. 
So there are potentially two ways out for rationalist conservatives.  In the remainder of this 
section I’ll argue that the first is no good but the second is tenable – and, indeed, advisable for 
reasons having nothing to do with the Same Boat Hypothesis.   
About strategy (1): restricting our notion of undermining allows far too much to count as 
good reasoning.  It’s often possible to use broadly Moorean patterns of reasoning in apriori 
contexts – if we restrict conservatism to the narrow conception of undermining then it won’t tell 
us what’s wrong with apriori forms of Mooreanism.  Consider these conditional proofs: 
Assumption for conditional proof: (Apriori Election-1) Someone just checked a box on 
a piece of paper and slid it into a slot 
"So: (Apriori Election-2) Someone just voted 
"So: (Apriori Election-3) An election is happening, rather than a rehearsal 
Therefore: (Apriori Election-4) If someone just checked a box on a piece of paper and 
slid it into a slot, then an election is happening, rather than a rehearsal 
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Assumption for conditional proof: (Apriori Moorean Induction-1) In the past, observed 
regularities have tended to continue into the future 
!So: (Apriori Moorean Induction-2) From now on, observed regularities will tend to 
!continue into the future 
!So: (Apriori Moorean Induction-3): not-NUW 
Therefore: (Apriori Moorean Induction-3) If in the past, observed regularities have 
tended to continue into the future, then not-NUW 
 
These bits of reasoning don’t look any better than their aposteriori counterparts, so it’s hard to 
see the appeal of an understanding of conservatism that condemns the aposteriori versions of 
these arguments while remaining silent on the apriori ones.  Worse still, we get the result that 
someone cannot form a justified belief in not-NUW via Moorean Induction 1-3, but can form a 
justified belief in not-NUW by reasoning through Apriori Moorean Induction 1-4, then noting 
that observed regularities have held in the past, and then concluding that not-NUW.33  Will it 
help to say that, though these bits of reasoning are apriori, the proposition in the assumption is 
still, in some sense, evidence for the second step?  Not really; we can just tweak the argument 
further: 
Assumption for conditional proof: (Rational Moorean Induction-1) In the past, 
observed regularities have tended to continue into the future 
!So: (Rational Moorean Induction-2) It is rational to believe that, from now !on, 
"observed regularities will tend to continue into the future 
!So: (Apriori Moorean Induction-3): It is rational to believe that not-NUW 
Therefore: (Rational Moorean Induction-3) If in the past, observed regularities have 
tended to continue into the future, then it is rational to believe that not-NUW 
 
Here the assumption supports the second step, but it really can’t be described as evidence for it.  
While the conclusion of this argument is different from the ones above—it will only allow us to 
derive a claim about rational belief—it is enough to keep skepticism at bay.  So restricting our 
notion of undermining won’t really block Moorean responses to skepticism; it only requires 
tweaking them slightly so that they involve conditional proofs.  The first way out is no good. 
                                                
33 Of course, foes of Mooreanism can get around this result by arguing that the proposed reasoning exhibits 
transmission failure.  But the version of conservatism we are now considering—one with a restricted notion of 
“underminer”—cannot explain why this reasoning would exhibit transmission failure.  So we’d need some other 
principle for restricting the transmission of justification – and, of course, we’d need to be sure that principle didn’t 
defeat any justification to believe not-VMN.   
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 What about the second – weakening our notion of antecedent justification to believe so 
that acquiring a justified belief that p on the basis of G doesn’t require being able to rationally 
conclude that underminers for the support lent by G to p are false ?   It turns out that, quite apart 
from considerations about VMN, conservatives ought to adopt the anemic notion of justification 
to believe.  If we plug the robust version of justification back into conservatism, it delivers 
implausible results in everyday cases.  Consider: 
 
The Seasoned Interviewer: Sasha has interviewed many criminal suspects for the police, and 
she is very good at her job.  After much practice and study, she is excellent at telling truth from 
lies and she knows it.  One day a colleague asks Sasha if a suspect who frequently touches his 
nose during an interview is more likely to be lying.  Sasha replies, truthfully, that she isn’t sure; 
she finds it very hard to articulate such rules in the abstract since her previous attempts to do so 
have been unsuccessful.  Shortly thereafter, Sasha interviews a suspect who frequently touches 
his nose.  Sasha acquires a justified belief that the suspect is lying, and her belief is based, in 
large part, on his frequent nose-touching. 
 
This sort of example shows that it is possible to form a justified belief in p on the basis of G 
while having evidence inconsistent with being able to form a justified belief in the falsity of an 
underminer for the support lent by G to p.  The reason Sasha cannot form a justified belief that 
the underminer is false isn’t that she lacks evidence for the anti-underminer; rather, she has 
evidence that she cannot reason her way towards a justified belief in it.  Yet anemic conservatism 
isn’t hopelessly weak: it will show what is wrong with Table 1-3 and Election 1-3, on the 
assumption that there’s no impediment to directly figuring out whether there’s a rehearsal going 
on or what color the lights are.   
All of this looks like good news for conservative rationalists: anemic conservatism won’t 
entail manipulative-2b, so it won’t make it impossible to respond to a skeptic armed with VMN.  
And anemic conservatism is plausible: it shows what’s wrong with some obviously bad 
arguments.  One question remains: will it block Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3?  
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3.6 ANEMIC CONSERVATISM AND THE SAME BOAT HYPOTHESIS 
 
Anemic conservatism doesn’t threaten to leave rationalists unable to respond to a skeptic armed 
with VMN.  However, adopting anemic conservatism only yields a way out of the Same Boat 
Hypothesis if anemic conservatism is inconsistent with Mooreanism.  The problem is: it’s not.  
Anemic Conservatism is consistent with Moorean reasoning sometimes being good reasoning.  
The problem cases arise when someone is in a position where (for some ordinary claim p based 
on grounds G where U undermines the support lent by G to p):  
 
(a) He has p-independent justification to believe that ~U in the anemic sense 
 
(b) There is no p-independent sound reasoning from his evidence which concludes in a 
doxastically justified belief that ~U; that is, he lacks p-independent justification to 
believe that ~U in the robust sense.   
 
(c) He can form a doxastically justified belief that ~U via reasoning from p, perhaps 
along with other premises.  That is, he can have p-dependent justification to believe ~U 
in the robust sense.   
 
If someone is in this position, prior to acquiring G there is no way for anyone with his evidence 
to form a doxastically justified belief that ~U (that’s condition (b)).  However, when he acquires 
evidence G, he can form a justified belief that p (that follows from (a) and Anemic 
Conservatism).  He can then form a doxastically justified belief that ~U via inference from p 
(that’s condition (c)).  But that’s just Moorean reasoning.   
As a concrete example, consider: 
 
The Seasoned Interviewer Redux: As before, Sasha is an excellent and experienced police 
interviewer.  Also as before, Sasha sincerely pleads agnosticism when a colleague asks her if a 
suspect who frequently touches his nose during an interview is more likely to be lying – she 
finds it hard to reason about such rules in the abstract and has a poor track record when doing so.  
Shortly thereafter, Sasha interviews a suspect who frequently touches his nose.  Sasha forms a 
justified belief that the suspect his lying and this belief is based, in large part, on his frequent 
nose-touching.  After the interview, Sasha remembers her colleague’s question.  She realizes that 
nose-touching seemed to her a clear sign that the subject was lying.  She concludes that frequent 
nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty after all. 
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Sasha has engaged in some Moorean reasoning here.   According to anemic conservatism, 
Sasha’s reasoning is kosher.  Here is why: 
 
(a’) Prior to conducting her interview with the nose-touching suspect, Sasha has adequate 
evidence to believe that frequent nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty so according to 
anemic conservatism there is no obstacle to Sasha acquiring a justified belief that the 
suspect is lying based on his frequent nose-touching. 
 
(b’) Prior to conducting her interview, there is no sound, undefeated bit of reasoning from 
Sasha’s evidence to the conclusion frequent nose-touching is a sign of dishonesty – all 
such routes are defeated by Sasha’s evidence that she is no good at reasoning about such 
rules in the abstract. 
 
(c’) Sasha can form a doxastically justified belief in frequent nose-touching is a sign of 
dishonesty via reasoning from the suspect is lying and the knowledge that her belief that 
the suspect is lying is based upon his frequent nose-touching.   
 
So, prior to conducting the interview, Sasha is rationally agnostic about frequent nose-touching 
is a sign of dishonesty.  But, once she does conduct the interview, she can form a justified belief 
that the suspect is lying, and then a justified belief in frequent nose-touching is a sign of 
dishonesty.  There is nothing wrong with this Moorean pattern of reasoning – at least, not 
according to anemic conservatism.  The reason why this Moorean reasoning is kosher is that 
impediments to reasoning one’s way to a justified belief in a proposition can be fine-grained: 
they block certain routes rather than others.  Here, Sasha has evidence that she’s no good at 
formulating rules for evaluating testimony in the abstract, but no evidence that she can’t derive 
such rules from concrete cases.  That’s why she can’t just reason her way to frequent nose-
touching is a sign of dishonesty from reflection alone, but can do so by reasoning from her 
conclusion about a particular suspect.  Moorean reasoning offers a detour around the 
impediment.   
Anemic conservatism sometimes licenses Moorean forms of reasoning in humdrum 
cases, but that’s no strike against it, since Sasha’s reasoning is unobjectionable.  What matters, 
from the perspective of the Same Boat Hypothesis, is whether anemic conservatism licenses 
Moorean reasoning in response to global skeptical hypotheses: that is, whether it is consistent 
with Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 being good reasoning.  That question is tricky.  It 
turns on why Mooreans think we can’t form justified beliefs in not-BIV and not-NUW via 
apriori reflection alone.  A plausible account of why not is that we should not trust ourselves to 
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so reason – that we have compelling grounds to doubt our ability to figure out what are 
surroundings are like, or what the future will be like, by apriori reflection alone.  A little more 
carefully, we ought to believe: 
 
Rational limitation thesis – surroundings: Humans can typically only form justified contingent 
beliefs about their surroundings via reasoning that, at some point, depends upon perception or 
perceptual beliefs.34 
 
 
Rational limitation thesis – future: Humans can typically only form justified contingent beliefs 
about the future via reasoning that, at some point, depends upon induction.35 
 
Where, once again, I mean rational rather than psychological dependence.  If those theses are 
correct, there is an impediment to arriving at a justified belief in not-BIV or not-NUW via apriori 
reflection alone but no impediment to doing so via inference from perceptual or inductive 
beliefs.  That’s just the sort of situation wherein anemic rationalism licenses Moorean reasoning.   
Why believe in the rational limitation theses?  It’s worth noting that something like the 
rational limitation theses is implicit in the premises Nasty-1 and Nasty Induction-1: those 
premises depend, for their plausibility, on the thought that the only ways to learn about one’s 
surroundings and the future depend upon perception and induction.  Anyone at all worried by 
those arguments must find the rational limitation theses plausible.  Of course, that’s not an 
argument but it means that anyone worried by the skeptical problem that motivates the (apparent) 
choice between Mooreanism and rationalism must find the rational limitation theses at least 
initially compelling.  The only argument I can offer in their favor is a boring and empirical 
argument by elimination: I don’t see other routes that we use to form justified beliefs about 
contingent claims about our surroundings or the future.  When I observe people forming justified 
beliefs about their surroundings or their future, they always do so in a way that depends upon 
                                                
34 A possible type of counterexample includes claims such as there are not exactly 123456789 planets in the 
universe: this claim is contingent and plausibly apriori.  I am inclined to say that if such beliefs are justified apriori it 
is on the basis of some very weak version of the principle of indifference.  But thinking that we have apriori 
justification to believe there are not exactly 123456789 planets in the universe on the basis of some version of the 
principle of indifference does not give reason to believe that we can arrive at not-BIV through armchair reasoning; 
in fact, the principle of indifference (in its stronger guises) weighs against not-BIV being apriori.   
35 A complication: sometimes we can form justified belief about the future on the basis of testimony.  This is no 
great objection to the thesis in question since the source of the testimony, to be trustworthy, must have conducted an 
inductive inference (or received testimony from someone who has).   
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perception or induction.  There may be a deeper explanation of why the rational limitation theses 
are true or an apriori argument for them, but I don’t have either one; even so, I find the empirical 
case compelling.   
Of course, the rational limitation theses alone do not establish that Moorean responses to 
skepticism succeed; it must also be true that we have justification in the anemic sense to believe 
not-BIV and not-NUW prior to engaging in Moorean reasoning.  Put another way, the rational 
limitation theses (and similar impediments to paths of reasoning) must be the only reason why 
there is no undefeated deliberative route from our evidence to not-BIV and not-NUW.  Skeptics 
may balk at this and insist that, in addition, we just lack sufficient evidence for not-BIV or not-
NUW.  But, of course, rationalists are in no position to take that line of objection against 
Mooreans.  And this makes rationalists ill positioned, if we ought to believe in the rational 
limitation theses, to say what’s wrong with Moorean responses to skepticism.   
 
3.7 CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF THESIS IS RATIONALISM? 
 
Let’s take stock: we have so far surveyed three possible grounds for condemning Moorean 
reasoning, and found that rationalists cannot adopt any of them.  Each of these diagnoses thus 
doubly fails: it fails to offer a plausible criticism of Moorean reasoning, and in addition fails to 
offer (non-ad hoc) grounds for rejecting the Same Boat Hypothesis.     
What follows from this investigation?  First, we ought to be suspicious of our 
intuitions—intuitions that I share—that Moorean reasoning seems fishy.  Skeptical arguments 
have a powerful hold on us: even students new to philosophy feel the force of evil demon-style 
skeptical arguments, and almost nobody initially finds either rationalism or Mooreanism 
remotely compelling.  Yet it turns out to be a difficult affair to say just how these evil demon-
style skeptical arguments are supposed to work, and even more difficult to articulate the ways in 
which Moorean replies seem viciously circular.  We’ve managed to come up with three possible 
ways of spelling out this circularity, each of which suffers from a subtle problem.  All of this 
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complexity leads me to doubt that we should trust our guts here.  Perhaps we intuitively latch on 
to something like the insensitivity diagnosis or the dialectical inefficacy diagnosis (conservatism 
is probably too sophisticated to describe anyone’s gut reaction) and just don’t have sufficiently 
nuanced intuitions to pick up on the problems with these approaches.  In any case, even people 
who want to stick with their guts and count Moorean reasoning as no good still owe us a tenable 
story about what’s wrong with it.    
Second, we have seen that there is little role for rationalism to play as an anti-skeptical 
alternative to Mooreanism: if rationalist responses to skepticism are kosher, they are also 
unnecessary because Moorean responses are kosher as well.  The same boat thesis is true, so 
rationalism has nothing to offer as an anti-skeptical rival to Mooreanism. 
One way to interpret this last result is that there is no reason to be a rationalist.  I doubt, 
though, that that’s the right interpretation.  A better interpretation is that it is a mistake to think of 
Mooreanism and rationalism as rivals.  Mooreanism is a view about good reasoning: it says that 
arguments such as Moore 1-3 and Moorean Induction 1-3 are ways to acquire doxastically 
justified beliefs in their conclusions.  We can also interpret rationalism as a theory about good 
reasoning: the view that you can form justified beliefs in not-BIV and not-NUW through the 
simplest possible process of reasoning: you can just conclude them, and thereby be doxastically 
justified.  We’ve seen that any account of what’s wrong with Moorean reasoning will condemn 
that sort of rationalist response to a skeptic armed with VMN.  However, rationalism need not be 
a theory of good reasoning at all.  Another interpretation of rationalism is as a view about 
evidential support.  Bodies of evidence can weigh for or against propositions.  It’s tempting to 
think that an empty body of evidence—one containing no evidence—must, for any deeply 
contingent proposition p, give just the same degree of support to p as not-p.  Rationalism, if it’s a 
thesis about evidential support, is just the denial of this claim.  Rationalists think empty bodies of 
evidence aren’t always impartial between p and not-p.   
If rationalism is a view about evidential support and Mooreanism is a view about good 
reasoning, the two aren't obviously rivals.  This is good news for rationalists, since we’ve seen 
that rationalism as a thesis about good reasoning has no important anti-skeptical role to play.  It’s 
also good for Mooreans, since there are some compelling arguments in favor of the rationalist 
view of evidential support and the Moorean view of reasoning does not diminish the strength of 
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these arguments.36  The conclusion of my argument isn’t that rationalism is false, but rather 
that—when it comes to responding to skeptical arguments—it has a role to play solely as a view 
about evidential support; as a result, even rationalists need a story about how to reason our way 
to the falsity of skeptical scenarios.  Failure to discredit the Same Boat Hypothesis means that 
story will be—in key ways—Moorean.     
 
 
 
                                                
36 See Hawthorne (2002), White (2006), and Pryor (ms).  Neither Hawthorne nor White make the distinction 
between theories of evidential support and theories of good reasoning; however each argument weighs only in favor 
of rationalism understood as a view about evidential support.  White takes his argument to discredit Mooreanism, 
but only because he assumes that, whatever Mooreanism is, it must be inconsistent with the rationalist view of 
evidential support – just the view of the logical space that I’m inveighing against.   
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4.0  SKEPTICISM AND THE ETIOLOGY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS 
 
 
Each of us tries to conform to norms: practical norms, which govern our actions, and epistemic 
norms, which govern our beliefs.  A little reflection, though, can raise puzzles about whether any 
of us ought to believe that her norms, or her beliefs about norms, are correct: i.e. whether her 
beliefs about normative matters are true, and whether her epistemic and practical behavior 
corresponds with what she in fact has most reason to do.  One source of skepticism is persistent 
disagreement: if you and I embrace different norms, why should I think that I am correct and you 
are wrong, rather than vice versa?  That is a difficult question to answer, but even those who 
despair of defeating that skeptical worry can take comfort in the limited range of disagreement: 
humans embrace only a tiny fraction of the range of possible norms.  Here I will focus on a 
second, more troubling kind of skepticism: rather than a worry about whether my norms rather 
than yours are correct, it is a worry about whether any of our normative judgments are better than 
blind stabs in the dark.  According to this second worry, the near consensus among humans about 
the correct norms is no reason to take comfort; it is only a sign that we all err in similar ways. 
What is the source of this second type of skepticism? The worry rests on the observation 
that there is a causal story about why each of us follows some particular set of norms.  Consider, 
first, the set of causal factors that led me to embrace my norms: roughly, biological evolution, 
which is a mix of natural selection and purely random chance.37  There are all sorts of ways in 
which selection pressures would favor some norms over others: norms that helped our early 
ancestors find food, build shelters, avoid predators, show off to potential mates, and so on would 
                                                
37 Of course, cultural influences matter as well.  However, our cultures are made up of humans, each of whom is a 
product of natural selection.  So while cultural norms are an important proximal cause of my normative judgments, 
evolution is the most important distal cause.  So I will focus on evolution here, though the simplification will not 
matter very much.   
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contribute to survival and reproduction.  Other norms would not.  The skeptical puzzle arises 
because the correctness of the correct norms does not to add to their adaptive value.  Our 
ancestors were not, simply in virtue of having justified beliefs, or doing what they had most 
practical reason to do, in a better position to survive and reproduce.  Of course, justified beliefs 
or practically correct actions might also tend to have other features which did provide an 
evolutionary advantage, so evolution might thus have steered us towards using correct methods 
as a kind of fortuitous side-effect.  In any case, since following correct norms as such provided 
no adaptive advantage, it would be an astonishing piece of cosmic good luck if evolution resulted 
in our following correct norms.  This seems like a compelling reason to doubt that I’ve gotten it 
right – to believe that, whatever the merits of my norms, they are not correct ones.   
Though this skeptical argument is intriguing, it may be dead in the water.  A simple-
minded reply is that if we add a little more detail to the skeptic’s puzzle it loses its force.  The 
correct epistemic norms include induction, deduction, and believing what you perceive.  And it is 
no mystery why we evolved to favor those norms rather than counter-induction, wishful 
thinking, and believing what you imagine.  Our norms are, at least roughly, the reliable ones.  
Correct practical norms include refraining from murder, keeping promises, and caring about 
one’s own future well-being.  It’s no great mystery why we evolved to favor those norms rather 
than ones that encourage murder, untrustworthiness, and wanton disregard for tomorrow.  So, 
our landing on roughly the right norms doesn’t look so fortuitous after all.   
Of course, skeptics will not be satisfied with this reply: it has a whiff of intolerable 
question-begging about it.  The problem, roughly speaking, is that simple-minded anti-
skepticism invokes normative judgments—murder is wrong, induction is rational, and so on—
and there are the very judgments that skeptics call into question.  In some sense, then, this reply 
begs the question against skeptics.  However, it is not obvious whether skeptics can turn this 
worry into a damning charge against naïve anti-skepticism. 
My aim is to assess the force of skepticism based in thinking about the causal origins of 
our normative judgments.  This will require us to examine—in some detail—the ground rules for 
argument between skeptics and non-skeptics.  In particular, we will need to get straight on the 
merits of the sort of naïve anti-skepticism sketched above; doing so will require investigation of 
the delicate question of which argumentative strategies are viciously circular, as opposed to 
acceptably circular.  Along the way a few general lessons will emerge about which types of 
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skeptical argument can successfully deflect replies that are, in some sense, circular and which 
cannot.  The upshot of my discussion will be that there had better be an explanatory relation 
between the normative facts, on the one hand, and our normative judgments on the other.  This 
demand rules out non-naturalistic normative realism as well as particularist views wherein 
normative facts are “shapeless” at the non-normative level: each precludes the right sort of 
integration of normative facts into our picture of the explanatory order.  Part of what is exciting 
about this argument—aside from its upshot about the nature of the normative—is that it presents 
a challenge even for “Moorean” views that are extremely sanguine about circular responses to 
skepticism. 
Here’s what’s ahead: in part 1 I will describe an appealing view of the meta-normative 
that invites a skeptical worry.  In part 2 I will present the skeptical worry more carefully; this 
presentation will closely resemble some skeptical arguments endorsed in recent literature.  In 
part 3, I will argue that the standard presentation of the worry fails: anti-skeptics have a simple 
but devastating reply.  After showing problems with the standard presentation of the argument, I 
will introduce some epistemic machinery in part 4 and use that machinery to present a better 
version of the skeptical argument in parts 5 and 6.  Part 7 will specify which views of the 
normative can avoid the skeptical challenge.  Part 8 will conclude by briefly—and 
inconclusively—discussing grounds for doubting the argumentative strategy of this paper. 
  
4.1 WHO IS THE TARGET?  (PART I) 
 
The present skeptical worry stemming from the etiology of our normative judgments concerns 
the relations between our normative faculties on the one hand—i.e. whatever it is that causes us 
to produce the normative judgments that we do—and the normative facts on the other.  I will 
begin describing the problem by focusing on normative views that share two assumptions.  The 
first is factualism: the view that there are true normative propositions.  It is clear enough that no 
worry about whether our normative beliefs coincide with the facts can be hung around the necks 
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of non-factualists.  Factualism in this sense doesn’t require any sort of spooky normative realm; 
it simply requires that sentences with normative content can be true in a minimal, disquotational 
sense.  From now on, I will assume that factualism, in this minimal sense, is true. 
The second assumption is that there is no explanatory connection between the normative 
facts and the output of our normative faculties.  By this I mean three things: 
 
(1) Our normative judgments do not explain why the normative facts are what they are.   
 
(2) We do not have the particular normative faculties that we do because of the normative 
facts.   
 
(3) There is no third factor that explains both why we have the normative faculties that we do 
and why the normative facts are what they are.   
 
Why believe each of these claims?  (1) says that our tendencies to make certain judgments do not 
explain why the normative facts are what they are; roughly speaking, it says that the normative 
facts would be the same even if we had different normative faculties.  Constructivists may reject 
(1), but everyone else accepts it. 
(2) says that the normative facts do not explain why anyone came to have some particular 
set of normative faculties. For instance, it says that I do not have an innate tendency to find 
murder wrong because murder is, in fact, wrong.  Why believe in this assumption?  The only 
satisfactory type of explanation of why we have the normative faculties that we do will be a 
causal explanation.  Non-causal explanations can sometimes be appropriate, but not here – there 
is no good rational explanation of why we are born with certain faculties, and there doesn’t seem 
to be any good constitutive explanation of why we have some normative faculties rather than 
others.38  So fans of naturalism—the view that normative facts are identical to natural facts—
                                                
38 A possible complication: can someone argue that the normative facts do play a constitutive role in determining the 
contents of our thoughts, and thereby show that the normative facts constitutively explain why we have the faculties 
that we do?   Whether the normative facts play a role in determining the contents of our thoughts—that is, whether 
the fact that murder is wrong determines the content of what I express when I think “murder is wrong”—falls well 
outside of the scope of this paper (for a defense of such a position, see Wedgwood (2007)).  Even if normative facts 
do play such a role, however, there is limited room for a constitutive explanation of why we have the faculties that 
we do:  on such a view, normative facts play no role in explaining why we tend to think “murder is wrong” rather 
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can reject (2), but fans of other meta-normative views cannot.  Even for naturalists, though, 
rejecting (2) isn’t trivial: showing that normative facts are in the right ontological category to 
explain why we have the normative faculties that we do isn’t the same as showing that they 
actually explain it.   
Finally, (3) denies the existence of a third factor that explains both the normative facts 
and why we have particular normative faculties.  That is, it says that there is no x such that x 
explains why murder is wrong, and x explains why we have the normative faculties that we do. 
The defense of (3) is simple: there are no obvious candidates for x.   
I will call the conjunction of (1)-(3) Explanatory Independence, for short.  Though the 
above considerations are not a watertight argument for Explanatory Independence, I hope they 
are enough to render it plausible for now (we’ll re-examine the possibility of rejecting 
Explanatory Independence later on).  Many appealing forms of non-naturalistic realism—views 
of the sort defended by Dworkin, Nagel, Parfit, Raz, and Scanlon39 wherein normative claims are 
true (in the minimal, disquotational sense of “true”) but normative facts are not identical to 
natural facts and do not depend on what we happen to believe—are committed to Explanatory 
Independence.  In spite of its considerable plausibility, though, I will argue that Explanatory 
Independence has intolerable skeptical consequences.  As a result, we ought to reject it.  Before 
we can see the problem with Explanatory Independence, though, we’ll need to set out our 
skeptical worry with a great deal more care. 
   
4.2 A WORRY ABOUT COINCIDENCES 
 
If normative skepticism is false we may believe that, most of the time, our normative judgments 
and the normative facts coincide.  Let us suppose, for now, that Explanatory Independence is 
                                                                                                                                                       
than “murder is fine”.  So on such a view normative facts may play a role in determining why the output of our 
normative faculties count as expressing certain content, but that’s not what we’re looking for: an explanation of why 
we have normative faculties that tend to produce certain outputs.     
39 See, among other places, Dworkin (1996), Nagel (1986), Parfit (ms), Raz (1999), and Scanlon (2000). 
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true.  On the face of it, the coincidence between our normative judgments and the normative 
facts is puzzling because the two coinciding elements—our normative judgments and the 
normative facts—are determined by totally independent factors.  On the one hand, we know, in 
rough outline, why we humans have the normative beliefs that we do: our faculties of normative 
reasoning are the products of biological evolution, itself a result of natural selection and pure 
chance.  Natural selection tends, over time, to produce traits that are conducive to the survival 
and reproduction of a species and to eliminate traits that are not.  Thus, our proclivities to make 
certain normative judgments must be ones that, on the whole, contributed to the survival and 
reproductive success of our ancestors.40  Our ancestors evolved normative faculties in response 
to certain properties of actions and beliefs; our judgments are certainly not random.  The problem 
is that our ancestors could not have evolved particular normative faculties because those 
faculties produce largely true judgments: Explanatory Independence assures us as much.   On the 
other hand, our judgments play no role in determining the normative facts: Explanatory 
Independence assures us of this much, too.  
In general, when the two elements of some putative coincidence are explanatorily 
independent of one another, we ought not to believe that they coincide.  For instance, suppose I 
decide to make a telephone directory for Bangor, Maine, by coming up with names using a Ouija 
board and assigning each name a number based on seven consecutive rolls of a ten-sided die.  
The phone numbers of people in Bangor do not affect the listings in my book, and the listings in 
my book do not affect the phone numbers of the people in Bangor.  That the phone numbers and 
the listings in my book are determined independently doesn’t guarantee that my book is 
inaccurate, but it certainly renders any putative coincidence between my listings and the real 
phone numbers puzzling.  One way to spell out our skeptical worry, then, is that our normative 
judgments are like the homemade phonebook: it would be an astonishing coincidence if they 
were right.41  We can present this worry a bit more carefully: 
                                                
40 Another possibility is that our normative faculties have no survival value and arose as a fluke, but that possibility 
won’t help us to resist skepticism.   
41 A skeptical argument very much like Coincidence 1-5 is presented by Enoch (forthcoming), Schafer 
(forthcoming), and Street (forthcoming) and (ms), though Enoch and Schafer do not ultimately endorse the 
argument.   Field (1991) uses an argument along roughly these lines against mathematical Platonism – see, 
especially, the introduction.  
 Joyce (2006) and Street (2006) present related worries – I’ll say a bit more about Street’s “Darwinian 
Dilemma” in section 6.   
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Premise: (Coincidence-1) Explanatory Independence 
Premise: (Coincidence-2) If Explanatory Independence, then the alleged coincidence 
between our normative judgments and the normative facts is inexplicable. 
So: (Coincidence-3) The alleged coincidence between our normative judgments and the 
normative facts is inexplicable. 
Premise: (Coincidence-4) It is inappropriate to believe in an inexplicable coincidence 
between our normative judgments and the normative facts. 
Therefore: (Coincidence-5) We ought not to believe that our normative judgments and 
the normative facts coincide.   
 
Two notes about this argument.  First, this style of argument does not threaten to generalize to 
render all coincidences between our beliefs and the facts puzzling.  Consider ordinary perceptual 
beliefs.  The features that those beliefs are about—color, shape, size, and so on—are definitely 
well-positioned to figure in explanations of why we have the perceptual faculties that we do.  It 
is easy to envision, in rough outline, a causal explanation of the coincidence between the output 
of our perceptual faculties and the facts about material objects.42  Second, I raised the skeptical 
worry behind Coincidence 1-5 by mentioning evolution by natural selection.  However, 
Coincidence 1-5 does not mention evolution.  Thinking about evolution by natural selection 
makes the skeptical worry vivid, but does no more.  It does not matter what causal process led us 
to have the normative faculties that we do.  All that matters is that the process does not allow the 
normative facts to explain the output of our faculties; that is, does not allow us to say that we 
believe that murder is wrong because murder is wrong.  If we were the products of Lamarckian 
evolution, say, just the same skeptical problem would arise.  Coincidence 1-5 is apriori.   
Of course, not everybody needs to be troubled by this argument: meta-normative views 
that reject Explanatory Independence can reject the first premise.  Fans of Explanatory 
Independence, though, appear to face a problem.  The premise Concidence-2 is obviously 
correct.  Coincidence-4 looks strong as well.  It says that if the alleged coincidence between our 
judgments and the normative facts is inexplicable, then it is inappropriate to believe in it: trusting 
                                                
42 Arguments with roughly the shape of Coincidence 1-5 may raise skeptical doubts about other domains of belief.  
First, the same worry might arise over our beliefs about causally inefficacious domains such as mathematics and 
logic.  Second, an analogous argument might make trouble for beliefs about subject matters that our distant 
ancestors didn’t need to know about: distant stars, subatomic particles, and so on.  These are big issues worthy of 
separate treatment, so I’ll set them aside here.   
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those judgments is epistemically on a par with trusting the Ouija-and-dice generated Bangor 
phonebook.   
How bad is the conclusion, Coincidence-5?  Very bad.  We should distinguish 
Coincidence-5 from the mild skeptical claim that some distorting factors affected the evolution 
of our normative faculties.  That result is obvious: of course nobody should treat his judgments 
as a direct and infallible pipeline to the normative truth. However, if Coincidence-5 is true none 
of us can trust any of his normative judgments at all.  The problem is not just that they might be 
false—it is obvious that we have no guarantee of truth—but that it would be unreasonable to 
trust them.  The only rational reply would be agnosticism about all normative matters, and that is 
a radical position indeed.  Coincidence 1-5 thus presents a formidable challenge.  How should 
anti-skeptics reply? 
 
4.3 NAÏVE ANTI-SKEPTICISM 
 
The argument Coincidence 1-5 fails. A skeptic pushing Coincidence 1-5 tries to defeat normative 
knowledge by arguing that non-skeptics must believe the unbelievable: namely, that there is an 
enormous inexplicable coincidence between our normative judgments and the normative facts.  
This skeptical strategy requires the premise: 
 
(Coincidence-4) It is inappropriate to believe in an inexplicable coincidence between our 
normative judgments and the normative facts. 
 
The problem with Coincidence-4 is that it is often appropriate to believe in inexplicable cosmic 
coincidences.  For instance, suppose I buy one lottery ticket—the only one I’ve ever bought—
and the number on my ticket matches the winning number.  What are the odds!  Certainly I 
should doubt very much that such a thing will happen: when I buy the ticket, I should not believe 
that the number on my ticket and the winning number will coincide.  However, once the number 
on my ticket matches the number on TV, and I go to the lottery office and they say I’ve got a 
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winner, and reporters show up at my house, and friends start calling and asking for money, and 
checks from the lottery start arriving in the mail I may certainly believe in the enormous, 
unexplained coincidence. 
Perhaps the lottery example does not seem like a grand enough coincidence: after all, 
someone had to win.  But consider another, more puzzling coincidence: the coincidence between 
the actual physical constants and the physical constants that render life possible.  Had just about 
any physical constants been even a little different—gravity a little stronger, the strong force a 
little weaker, and so on—the universe would have either collapsed shortly after the Big Bang or 
quickly spread out into cold, boring soup of isolated particles.  Many, many constants had to fall 
within a very narrow range to render stars and planets, let alone life, possible.  This coincidence 
is as enormous as they come, and may turn out to be inexplicable as well.  But it would be crazy 
to become agnostic, on these grounds, about whether our universe is suitable for life.   
Skeptics may not be fazed by these counterexamples.  In the case of the lottery ticket or 
our physical laws, we have lots of evidence for the coincidence: checks coming in the mail, life 
all around, and so on.  But, skeptics may insist, there is nothing analogous in the case of the 
coincidence between normative judgments and normative facts.  If you had some analogous 
evidence that you were getting things right, it would be fine to believe in the coincidence; but 
you don’t, so it isn’t.43   
There is an obvious, simpleminded reply to this objection.  Evolution led us to believe 
that deliberate cruelty is wrong, and deliberate cruelty is indeed wrong, so look: evolution led us 
the right way.  Evolution led us to believe that induction generates justified beliefs, and induction 
does generate justified beliefs, so look: evolution led us the right way again.  This sort of 
vindication is not as cheap as it may look at first.  For instance, evolution appears to have led 
many people to find beliefs supported by the gambler’s fallacy plausible, even though nobody, 
after reflection, thinks that the gambler’s fallacy generates justified beliefs.  Similarly, evolution 
appears to have led most of us to care less about the suffering of people located far away, even 
though few of us want to endorse the principle that the suffering of people far away really does 
matter less.  We could imagine making a pattern of normative judgments that was incapable of 
being tamed into a coherent picture, and someone making such judgments would not be able to 
                                                
43 The lottery example, and a reply along the lines sketched here, comes from Street (ms).   
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reasonably believe that evolution led him the right way.  In actuality, however, these bits of 
tension seem to be relatively few and far between – it looks as if, most of the time, evolution led 
us to be inclined to get it right.44 
Here skeptics will cry foul.  This vindication, they argue, is circular.  But here the anti-
skeptic should dig in his heels.  Circular how?  Consider the argument: 
 
Premise: (Cruelty-1) Evolution led us to judge that deliberate cruelty is wrong 
Premise: (Cruelty-2) Deliberate cruelty is wrong 
Therefore: (Cruelty-3) Evolution led us to correct normative judgments about cruelty. 
 
This argument is not tautological: its conclusion does not appear among the premises.  In what, 
then, does its alleged circularity consist?   
A possible answer is that the argument uses as a premise Cruelty-2, which normative 
skeptics claim we cannot reasonably believe; thus the anti-skeptical picture is based on dubious 
foundations.  If we cannot reasonably believe Cruelty-2 and similar normative claims, we have 
no basis to believe in a coincidence between our judgments and the normative facts.  Thus, the 
anti-skeptical position cannot be consistently held.  However, this charge is too quick. Certainly 
someone who accepts Coincidence-5 should not trust his normative judgments, and someone 
who (for whatever reason) does not trust his normative judgments cannot engage in reasoning 
along the lines of Cruelty 1-3.  Similarly, skepticism about individual normative claims (such as 
Cruelty-2) leaves one unable to respond to Coincidence 1-5, but that does not show that the rest 
of us must accept Coincidence-5.  It does show that accepting one skeptical claim but not the 
other—i.e. being skeptical about ordinary normative judgments such as Cruelty-2 but rejecting 
Coincidence-5, or vice versa—is an untenable position.  However, there is no inconsistency in 
the unabashed non-skeptical stance: accepting Cruelty-2 (and other ordinary normative claims) 
and rejecting Coincidence-5.  If the skeptic’s aim is to show inconsistency within the common 
sense position, he fails.    
Skeptics might want to say something else: not that the non-skeptical position is 
internally inconsistent, but that invoking ordinary normative judgments such as Cruelty-2 as part 
of a response to Coincidence 1-5 violates some dialectical rule.  Trusting ordinary normative 
                                                
44 Something like this reply to a similar worry is offered in Dworkin (1996). 
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judgments in some sense presupposes that skepticism is wrong.  Invoking such judgments to 
argue against skeptics feels non-kosher; it’s a kind of question-begging.  In one sense, this 
response is correct: a rational skeptic need not be convinced by the naïve anti-skeptical strategy.  
If the game is convincing rational skeptics, the naïve response loses. 
However, the inability of naïve anti-skepticism to rationally convince skeptics is no great 
failing, for two reasons.  First, this failing does not rule out the use of the naïve reply as a reason 
for non-skeptics to continue to trust their normative judgments.  We cannot rule out any reply to 
skepticism that uses the judgments that skeptics call into question: that would make victory for 
the skeptic all too easy.  Consider a skeptic who asserts that nobody can reasonably believe 
anything.  Any reply to this sort of skeptic is question-begging in the sense that it will use one of 
the very claims that skeptics deny we can reasonably believe as a premise in an argument against 
skepticism.  If that sort of circularity is always bad, the skeptic wins; indeed, he wins without 
giving any argument at all.  That cannot be right.  The upshot is that skeptics cannot rule out-of-
bounds the practice of defending non-skeptical positions by invoking judgments that skepticism 
calls into question.  While skeptics do not have to be convinced by the naïve reply, they have not 
shown that non-skeptics cannot feel secure in their own views as a result of giving the naïve 
reply.  If the game is rationally defending non-skepticism, the naïve response succeeds. 
Second, rationally-convince-the-skeptic is a sucker’s game.  The problem is not that it is 
hard – though, of course, it is.  Rather, the problem is that it is pointless even if it succeeds.  
Skeptics offer only ad hominem arguments: they try to show that common sense is inconsistent.  
But skeptics do not adopt internally consistent positions and this is why skeptics, since antiquity, 
have denied that they mean to defend any position at all.  In the present case, a skeptic pushing 
Coincidence 1-5 asserts a normative claim about what it is appropriate to believe: specifically, 
Coincidence-4.  Someone who denies that it is rational to believe any normative claims and yet 
believes Coincidence-4 has an incoherent position.  So it would be no great feature of an anti-
skeptical strategy that it could rationally convince a skeptic: that would mean that a rational 
skeptic would have to abandon her position on pain of inconsistency, but even absent an anti-
skeptical reply a rational skeptic must abandon her position on pain of inconsistency. That’s why 
skeptics have to deny that they are defending a position.  So winning a game of rationally-
convince-the-skeptic would not get anti-skeptics anything that they do not already have.   
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On the one hand, skeptics lose this round.  Anti-skeptics have an internally consistent 
position: someone who trusts his normative judgments can deny Coincidence-5 and thus 
appropriately retain his normative judgments. A skeptic cannot rule out the naïve line of reply.  
On the other hand, it is easy to sympathize with the skeptic’s complaint that his opponent’s 
rather breezy and circular reply does not get to the heart of the worry.  Skeptics are right about 
this, but the problem lies not with the anti-skeptic’s reply—which, while breezy, certainly 
works—but with Coincidence 1-5.  That argument has little skeptical force, but there is another 
worry in the same neighborhood that is far more powerful.  Before we can state it, and see why it 
defeats naïve anti-skepticism, we need to get straight on evidential support and defeat.   
 
4.4 EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT: HOW TO GET IT AND HOW TO LOSE IT 
 
Before stating a more powerful skeptical argument we need three pieces of epistemic machinery.  
First, we need a theory of evidential support.  Under what circumstances does some evidence E 
provide rational support for p?  That is, what relationship must E and p have in order for learning 
that E to make belief that p more reasonable?  One natural view is that E is evidence for p if and 
only if there is some explanatory relation between E and p.  I will officially remain agnostic 
about the if direction of this claim, but I will embrace the only if direction, i.e. I will accept: 
 
Explanatory Constraint: E can be evidence for (or against) p only if there is some 
explanatory relation between E and p.   
 
 
Where E is explanatorily related to p just in case either S learning that E makes p a better (or 
worse) explanation of S’s total evidence than it was before he learned that E or S learning that E 
makes S’s total evidence a better (or worse) explanation of p than it was before.  Put another 
way, if learning that E does not make p a better (or worse) explanation of one’s total evidence or 
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make one’s total evidence a better (or worse) explanation of p, Pr(p|E) = Pr(p).45  Two 
clarifications about the Explanatory Constraint: first, it tells us about relations between 
propositions in general - it does not require that the relevant propositions must be true.  We can 
have misleading evidence.  Second, there are several ways for propositions to be explanatorily 
related.  If p explains q then p can be evidence for q and q can be evidence for p.  A fire in the 
fireplace explains why there is smoke coming out of the chimney: so there is a fire in the 
fireplace can be evidence for there is smoke coming out of the chimney and there is smoke 
coming out of the chimney can be evidence for there is a fire in the fireplace.  In addition, if q 
and r have a common explanation, q can be evidence for r and r can be evidence for q.  A fire in 
the fireplace explains heat emanating from the fireplace and smoke coming out of the chimney, 
so there is smoke coming out of the chimney can be evidence for there is heat emanating from the 
fireplace, and there is heat emanating from the fireplace can be evidence for there is smoke 
coming out of the chimney.   
Why believe in the explanatory constraint?  The answer lies in rationality of making an 
inference to the best explanation.  Suppose that S has total evidence T, and the best explanation 
for all of this evidence is p, rather than some mutually exclusive alternative hypothesis q (for 
simplicity, we’ll assume p and q are the only contenders).  So, S forms a justified belief that p via 
inference to the best explanation.  Then, S acquires a new bit of evidence, E, which is 
explanatorily unrelated both to whether p and to whether q.  Suppose, for reductio, that E is 
powerful evidence for q: powerful enough to make it rational to abandon belief in p and replace 
it with belief in q.  If S ought to believe the best explanation of his evidence, this move is 
irrational: by the definition of explanatory relevance, learning that E does not make q a better 
explanation of S’s total evidence than it was before (and doesn’t make p a worse explanation 
than it was before) so p is still the best explanation of S’s total evidence.  Inference to the best 
explanation demands that S continue to believe that p. So we have a contradiction: it both is and 
is not possible that it is rational for S to abandon p in favor of q.  Thus we ought to reject our 
assumption: that E can be powerful evidence for q.  The same argument applies, albeit less 
dramatically, if we imagine that E is somewhat less powerful evidence for q and thus only affects 
                                                
45 By the shorthand Pr(x), I mean the evidential probability of x.  A bit more carefully, the evidential probability of 
x is a measure of the strength of the evidence that bears in favor of x, divided by the strength of all the possible 
evidence that could bear in favor of x.  We need this latter condition because the “evidential probability” of e.g. 
logical claims is 1, even for someone who has no evidence in their favor.   
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the degree to which S ought to be confident in p and in q.  If each of us ought to accord our 
degrees of belief according to how well each hypothesis explains our evidence, becoming less 
confident in p upon learning E will be rational only if E is explanatorily related to p.  Inference to 
the best explanation and the Explanatory Constraint go hand in hand: anybody who rejects the 
latter must reject the former.  Since rejecting inference to the best explanation is a radical move, 
and the Explanatory Constraint is independently plausible, we ought to embrace both.   
The Explanatory Constraint may look familiar: it resembles, to some degree, Gilbert 
Harman’s “explanatory relevance test”.46  Certainly the two constraints share some features in 
common, but the Explanatory Constraint is weaker than Harman’s test in three ways.  First, 
Harman says that we have evidence for p only if p helps explain the occurrence of some 
observation.  The Explanatory Constraint does not share this exclusive focus on relevance to 
explaining the occurrence of observations: E is evidence for p only if there is an explanatory 
relation between E and p, but E needn’t be the occurrence of an observation.  Second, Harman’s 
test requires that some claim figure in the best or simplest explanation of an observation; at least, 
his argument requires as much.47  The Explanatory Constraint simply requires some explanatory 
relation.  Third, Harman allows only one kind of explanatory relevance: an observation is 
evidence for p only if p helps explain that observation.  The Explanatory Constraint allows for 
three kinds of explanatory relevance: an observation is evidence for p if p helps explain that 
observation, or if the observation explains p, or if some common third factor explains both p and 
the observation.  Together these make the Explanatory Requirement far less radical than 
Harman’s test. 
So much, then, about how to acquire evidential support; we also need an account of how 
to lose it.  Suppose Samantha has a belief that p that is based—psychologically dependent—
upon some evidence E; E is strong enough evidence to render Samantha’s belief that p justified.  
A defeater for p is a proposition such that, were Samantha to come to reasonably believe it, she 
would no longer have justification to believe that p.  One type of defeater is an outweighing 
defeater: a proposition that provides evidence for the falsity of p and thus renders belief in p 
inappropriate in spite of the reasons given by E for counting p true.  An outweighing defeater 
leaves the rational support that E lends to p unchanged. Another type of defeater is an 
                                                
46 See Harman (1988). 
47 For more on this point, see Sturgeon (1988) and Quinn (1986) 
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underminer.  Learning that an underminer is true eliminates the rational support that E lends to 
p.  For instance, suppose I’m waiting for some dinner guests and I hear the ring of a doorbell.  
That evidence gives me justification to believe that my guests have arrived.  Then I open the 
door and see that nobody is standing there: my justification to believe that my guests have 
arrived has been outweighed.  Suppose instead that learn that the doorbell sound came from the 
television: my justification to believe that my guests have arrived has been undermined.48 
We can differentiate outweighing and undermining defeaters in formal terms.  If O is an 
outweighing defeater for p, then 
 
 Pr(p|O) < Pr(p) 
 
since O is evidence for ~p.  If one learns that O, one ought to become less confident that p.  If U 
is an undermining defeater for the support lent by E to p, then 
 
 Pr(p|U and E) = Pr(p) 
 
U is not evidence for ~p; rather, it removes whatever support E lends to p.  If one learns that U, 
he ought to be no more confident in p than he would be if he lacked evidence E; in other words, 
U removes whatever prima facie support E lends to p.49   
Finally, we can combine our theory of evidential support with our taxonomy of evidential 
defeat.  The theory of evidential support outlined above allows us to transform a worry about an 
inexplicable coincidence into a worry about undermining.  So far we have established, via the 
Explanatory Constraint, that  
 
 Pr(p|E) > Pr(p) only if there is an explanatory connection between E and p 
                                                
48 Many propositions diminish the rational support that E lends to p to some degree.  I will use the term underminer, 
though, only to refer to propositions that eliminate the rational support that E lends to p entirely.  
49 For (much) more on the formal treatment of defeaters, see Kotzen (ms). 
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In addition, we have established that U undermines the evidential force of E if 
 
 Pr(p|U and E) = Pr(p) 
 
These claims, together, entail if I learn that there is no explanatory connection between E and p, 
the support lent by E to p is undermined.  Since I ought to respond to underminers by dismissing 
any prima facie support lent by E to p, learning about the lack of explanatory connection 
between p and E entails that I ought to dismiss any prima facie support lent by E to p.  In the 
next section we will examine the skeptical implications of this result. 
 
4.5 UNDERMINING AND SKEPTICISM 
 
Earlier we examined a failed skeptical argument, the crux of which was a worry about an 
inexplicable cosmic coincidence between our judgments and the normative facts.  We can now 
state a related argument, the crux of which is that the output of our normative faculties provides 
no evidential support to any normative proposition.  Why not?  Because, according to the views 
outlined in the previous section, any such prima facie evidential support is undermined. 
I’ll show a version of this skeptical worry that makes trouble for a particular view of 
normative epistemology, wherein justified normative beliefs are based on evidence from the 
output of our normative faculties (in the next section, I’ll extend the skeptical argument so that it 
applies to alternative epistemologies of the normative).  There is more than one form for such 
basing to take.  One form is that normative faculties produce something non-doxastic—
normative intuitions, say—upon which normative beliefs are based.  Another form is for 
normative faculties to spit out basic normative beliefs, which serve as the evidence for other non-
basic beliefs; those normative beliefs are either self-basing, or else mutually based on one 
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another.  The difference between these two models—and their multiple variants—need not 
concern us here.  What matters is that the output of faculties, a kind of psychological fact, is 
evidence for normative beliefs.  We now have the tools to challenge this view:   
 
Premise: (Undermining-1) Explanatory Independence 
Premise: (Undermining-2) If Explanatory Independence, then there is no explanatory 
connection between the output of anyone’s normative faculties and the normative facts  
So: (Undermining-3) There is no explanatory connection between the output of anyone’s 
normative faculties and the normative facts 
Premise: (Undermining-4) If there is no explanatory connection between the output of 
anyone’s normative faculties and the normative facts, then any prima facie evidential 
support lent by the output of anyone’s normative faculties to any normative claims is 
undermined. 
Therefore: (Undermining-5) Any prima facie evidential support lent by the output of 
anyone’s normative faculties to any normative claims is undermined. 
 
The conclusion of this argument is not that all of out normative judgments are false, nor even 
that we should not believe them.  Instead, the conclusion is something weaker: the outputs of 
people’s normative faculties do not provide any evidence for any normative conclusion.  For 
instance, that you believe murder is wrong, or have the intuition that murder is wrong, or are 
inclined to judge that murder is wrong is no evidence that murder is wrong.  The same goes for 
the output of other people’s normative faculties: that Socrates believes murder is wrong is no 
evidence that murder is wrong.   
Undermining 1-5 has the same rough shape as Coincidence 1-5: does the same sort of 
objection plague it?  A similar kind of naïve anti-skepticism may look promising: I know that my 
normative faculties lead me to believe that murder is wrong, and murder is indeed wrong; I know 
that my normative faculties lead me to believe that induction is rational, and induction is indeed 
rational, and so on.  Taking all of this evidence together: the track record points pretty clearly 
towards our having reliable normative faculties.  If we’ve got good reason to believe that our 
normative faculties are reliable then their output is evidence for normative claims.  Thus it is not 
at all obvious that the evidential force of the output of our faculties is undermined.  
One worry about this line of response is that it involves an odious form of 
bootstrapping: using some the output of some faculty or device as part of an inductive argument 
for the reliability of that faculty or device.  For instance, suppose I trust the output of some 
thermometer, but someone else challenges its reliability.  It will do no good to respond by saying 
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“yesterday the thermometer said it was 48º and indeed it was 48º (how do I know?  I checked the 
thermometer!); two days ago the thermometer said it was 61º and indeed it was 61º (how do I 
know?  I checked the thermometer!)…and so on, so the thermometer must be quite reliable”.  
However, the present case differs from obviously ineffectual forms of bootstrapping in at least 
two ways.  First, while bootstrapping is no way to come to believe in the reliability of a 
particular device, say, it is not clear that bootstrapping is inappropriate when it involves some 
entire domain of beliefs.  Skepticism is just too easy to come by if I am not allowed to use the 
output of my normative faculties in an argument for the reliability of my normative faculties, or 
the output of my material-object-belief faculties in an argument for the reliability of my material 
object beliefs, and so on.  Second, in the thermometer case there is no possibility of getting a 
different result.  I know in advance—before ever taking a reading from the thermometer—that 
the test of comparing the thermometer’s output with the temperature (as determined by the 
thermometer’s output) will end up yielding a perfect track record for the thermometer.  The test 
thus adds nothing.  However, things could have turned out differently with our normative 
faculties: for instance, each of us might have been inclined to endorse a bunch of inconsistent 
normative judgments, or endorse quite different normative judgments at different times, or find 
other reasons for suspicion contained within our normative judgments.  In practice there is a bit 
of inconsistency—nearly everyone has normative intuitions that, upon reflection, she is 
unwilling to endorse—but on the whole each person’s normative judgments look internally 
consistent enough to be largely, if imperfectly, trustworthy.  The question of what, precisely, 
makes a bit of reasoning an odious form of bootstrapping is delicate, but it is far from clear 
whether charges of bootstrapping will stick against the simple anti-skeptical move.50, 51 
There is a more damning worry about the present anti-skeptical strategy: it relies on the 
very normative judgments that, according to Undermining-5, we should not trust.  This feature of 
the anti-skeptical reply is familiar.  Once again, the question is whether the anti-skeptic’s use of a 
normative judgment as part of an objection to a skeptical argument constitutes a vicious 
                                                
50 For more on bootstrapping, see Weisberg (forthcoming) and White (2006). 
51 Was the naïve reply to Coincidence 1-5 an instance of bootstrapping?  I think not.  One difference between that 
reply and canonical cases of bootstrapping is that the naïve reply to Coincidence 1-5 does not draw any claims about 
reliability from the observation that his normative beliefs have largely been true. Weisberg (forthcoming) argues that 
the inference from a claim about a track record to a claim about reliability is precisely where bootstrapping goes 
wrong: if he is right, the reply to Coincidence 1-5 is not fine even if the reply to Undermining 1-5 is not.   
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circularity.  We are assuming, for now, that the relevant normative judgments—murder is wrong, 
induction is rational, and so on—are based on the output of normative faculties (we will relax 
this assumption in the next section).  The question of whether the anti-skeptical move is 
viciously circular turns out to be: is it acceptable for an anti-skeptic to use a normative claim, p, 
as part of an argument for the falsity of an underminer, U, which undermines his evidential 
support for p?  It turns out that there is a substantial literature on this very question.  Some 
philosophers, called Mooreans, believe that you can use a belief p based on evidence E as part 
of a deliberative route that concludes with a newly justified belief that not-U.  Mooreans are so 
named because G. E. Moore’s “proof” of the external world has just that structure: he uses the 
belief that he has hands, based on perceptual experience, as part of a deliberative route that 
(according to Moore) concludes in a newly justified belief in the falsity of an underminer for the 
support lent by perceptual experience to the belief that he has hands (i.e. the falsity of the claim 
there is no external world).  Mooreanism is quite controversial: many, many philosophers 
believe that Moore’s proof is viciously circular. 
Fortunately for us, but unfortunately for fans of the present anti-skeptical strategy, we do 
not need to settle the dispute between Mooreans and their foes here.  The dispute about 
Mooreanism is a dispute about what happens when somebody is rationally agnostic about an 
underminer.  Mooreans think that you can use a belief that p based on E as part of a deliberative 
route that concludes in a justified belief that U—about which you were previously rationally 
agnostic—is false. 52  Anti-Mooreans disagree: they believe that one needs to have p-independent 
justification to believe that not-U in order to conclude that p on the basis of E.  But all parties to 
this dispute agree that anyone who has a justified belief in U cannot conclude that p on the basis 
of E, and certainly cannot use a belief that p as part of an argument for the falsity of U. For 
instance, suppose I have good reason to believe that I am a brain in a vat: perhaps the words YOU 
ARE A BRAIN IN A VAT keep scrolling along the bottom of my visual field.  In that case, even 
Mooreans do not think I can use Moore’s “proof” to determine that I am not a brain in a vat; 
even Mooreans believe that people who have good reason to believe that they are brains in vats 
should not trust their perceptual judgments.  If there is a genuine reason to believe in some 
underminer for the support lent by the output of our normative faculties to normative 
                                                
52 For more on the notion that Mooreanism is about the rational response to agnosticism about underminers, see 
Pryor (2004).   
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propositions, nobody can use normative propositions as part of an argument for the falsity of that 
underminer.  The naïve anti-skeptical move doesn’t work here.   
We can generalize this point and distinguish two varieties of skeptical argument that 
focus on undermining, also called “Academic” skepticism.  The first, more familiar variety of 
argument—including typical evil demon/brain-in-a-vat/dreaming skepticism—involves three 
moves.  First, it raises some undermining skeptical hypothesis, U.  Second, it claims that if 
someone is agnostic about U, and U undermines the support lent by E to p, he ought to be 
agnostic (at best) about p.  Third, it points out that the support for the claims needed to argue for 
the falsity of U—for instance, perceptual beliefs—is undermined by U and that therefore we 
ought to be agnostic about U (and thus agnostic, at best, about p).  Whether or not this strategy 
succeeds is a fascinating question; though few philosophers are convinced by this sort of 
argument—skeptics are rare—there is a remarkable lack of consensus about just where it goes 
wrong.  A second, less common skeptical strategy provides an argument for U using premises 
that non-skeptics accept.  It then claims that if someone ought rationally to believe that U, and U 
undermines the support lent to E by p, he ought to be agnostic (at best) about p.  Finally, it points 
out that the support for the claims needed to argue for the falsity of U is undermined by U.  I will 
call this second type of argument motivated Academic skepticism, since it involves giving 
affirmative motivation for U.  I will call the former, more common type, unmotivated 
Academic skepticism.53  The way to respond to motivated Academic skepticism is to challenge 
the motivation for U without relying on the claims whose support is undermined.  The bad news 
is that motivated Academic skepticism is thus very hard to defeat.  The good news is motivated 
Academic skeptical hypotheses are hard to come by: nobody has a colorable argument that I am 
a brain-in-a-vat, or whatever.  However, if Explanatory Independence is correct then 
Undermining 1-5 is a piece of motivated Academic skepticism.   
This account of the difference between motivated and unmotivated Academic skepticism 
explains why Undermining 1-5 is more successful than traditional external world skepticism, but 
does not explain why Undermining 1-5 is more successful than Coincidence 1-5.  In each case 
the skeptical hypothesis is motivated.  The difference is, roughly, that Coincidence 1-5 raises 
                                                
53 Skeptical arguments are not motivated or unmotivated tout court.  Rather, they are motivated or unmotivated 
relative to a particular target: i.e. a skeptical argument is motivated if the target of the argument accepts the premises 
used to argue for the undermining hypothesis.   
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skeptical doubt too late.  The strategy of a skeptic armed with Coincidence 1-5 is to point to all 
of our normative judgments and raise the worry that the (alleged) coincidence between those 
judgments and the normative facts is mysterious and therefore worrying.  But he is not obviously 
right, since those normative beliefs contain the tools to demystify the coincidence.  The skeptical 
argument tries to point out a tension in our ordinary position, but fails to do so: while it may 
establish that there is a consistent skeptical alternative, it cannot show that our ordinary position 
is incoherent.  In contrast, a skeptic armed with Undermining 1-5 can point to each of our 
normative beliefs individually and argue that its (alleged) basis does not, in fact, provide it with 
any evidential support.  She claims there is no way we could have gotten justified normative 
beliefs in the first place: those beliefs are based on normative beliefs, intuitions, or inclinations 
to judge, but the support of that basis for those beliefs is undermined.   
Undermining 1-5 thus has two powerful features.  First, it is an Academic skeptical 
argument: the skeptical hypothesis Undermining-5 undermines the rational support of all of the 
propositions that anti-skeptics might use to defend their position. Second, it is motivated: it does 
not just present an Academic skeptical hypothesis, but provides an argument for it based on 
premises that non-skeptics accept.  This combination of features generates a compelling skeptical 
threat indeed.  Of course, all of this need only worry someone who claims that justification for 
our normative beliefs depends upon evidence in the form of the output of our normative 
faculties.  Can an anti-skeptic evade the force of Undermining 1-5 by adopting another view of 
the epistemology of the normative, wherein the output of our normative faculties need not be 
evidence for normative claims? 
 
4.6 DO OTHER VIEWS OF NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY FARE ANY BETTER? 
 
What other forms can an epistemology of the normative take?  All views must fall into (at least) 
one of three categories: 
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(i) justified belief in normative claims is not based on any evidence whatsoever 
 
(ii) justified belief in normative claims is based on non-normative evidence 
 
(iii) justified belief in normative claims is based on evidence in the form of the normative 
facts themselves54 
 
These views are not mutually exclusive—someone can think that justification for normative 
beliefs comes from more than one source—but they are collectively exhaustive.  Support for 
normative claims must bottom out in normative evidence, non-normative evidence, or no 
evidence at all.  Undermining 1-5 does not, on its own, make trouble for views of types (i)-(iii).  
However, if Explanatory Independence is true then these views don’t dodge the underlying 
skeptical worry – all they do is shift the problem.   
The trouble for views of types (i)-(iii) lies in the conditional 
 
Trust Requirement: If [someone can form a justified belief that p on the basis of 
process R] then [the output of R is evidence that p] 
 
 
The motivation for the Trust Requirement is simple: either it’s reasonable to believe that some 
process R concluding with my believing that p indicates the truth of p or it isn’t. If it is, then the 
output of R is evidence that p.  If it isn’t, I cannot form a justified belief that p on the basis of R.  
Either way the Trust Requirement holds. This is easiest to see with examples: if I can form a 
justified belief that it is 3:00 on the basis of consulting a clock, then the clock saying that it is 
3:00 is evidence that it is 3:00, if I can form a justified belief in a logical claim p on the basis of 
Russell’s testimony then Russell asserting some logical claim p is evidence that p, and so on.  
Note that the Trust Requirement applies to apriori domains: for instance, logic is apriori if 
anything is, but the assertions of trustworthy logicians such as Russell can still be evidence for 
the truth of logical claims.  To say that logic is apriori is to say that there is a way of arriving at 
logical truths that does not require basing on empirical evidence; it is not to say that there can be 
no evidence for logical claims.   
                                                
54 This taxonomy follows Setiya (forthcoming). 
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The Trust Requirement, combined with the results of the previous section, makes trouble 
for views of types (i)-(iii).  First, take (i): the rationalist view that justified belief in normative 
claims is not based on any evidence whatsoever.  If rationalism is correct, then if I am reasoning 
well I will reach correct normative conclusions (even absent evidence for those conclusions).  
However, error is possible on such views: not everyone reasons well.  Skeptics can make trouble 
for rationalism if they can provide grounds to doubt that one is reasoning well.  And it turns out 
that they can.  We know that there is no explanatory connection between my using apriori 
reasoning to reach the normative conclusion that p, on the one hand, and p, on the other.  
According to the Explanatory Constraint, then, Pr(p|I use apriori reasoning to reach the 
normative conclusion that p) = Pr(p).  Thus, any prima facie evidential support lent by I use 
apriori reasoning to reach the normative conclusion that p to p is undermined.  The conclusions 
of my apriori reasoning do not provide evidence for any normative claim, and neither do any 
else’s.  According to the Trust Requirement, if I could form justified beliefs in normative claims 
on the basis of apriori reasoning, then the conclusions of my apriori reasoning would be evidence 
for or against those claims.  By modus tollens, I cannot form justified beliefs in normative claims 
on the basis of apriori reasoning. 
Can rationalists resist this argument by saying that justification for normative claims is 
had by default, and thus isn’t based on apriori reasoning or any other psychological process?  No. 
The problem isn’t that there can’t be default justification; rather, the problem is that normative 
beliefs don’t fit the bill. If normative beliefs were default, tampering with psychological 
processes would leave the justification untouched. Yet if I found out that all of my current moral 
beliefs are the result of brainwashing, say, I ought to lower my confidence in them.  This shows 
that if I shouldn’t trust my apriori reasoning, justification for apriori beliefs is threatened.   
Type (ii) views, which hold that justified belief in normative claims is based on evidence 
in the form of non-normative propositions, face the same sort of problem as view of type (i).  On 
type (ii) views, too, error must be possible: someone can draw false normative conclusions from 
non-normative evidence.  Someone’s normative conclusions need only be true if he both has the 
right non-normative evidence and reasons well from that evidence to normative conclusions. 
Here, too, skeptics can provide grounds to doubt one’s normative conclusions if they can provide 
grounds to doubt that one is reasoning well.  And, once again, they can.  There is no explanatory 
connection between I draw the normative conclusion that p from non-normative evidence E and 
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p, therefore the former is no evidence for the latter.  We can use the Trust Requirement to 
perform another modus tollens and conclude that I cannot form justified beliefs in normative 
conclusions on the basis of inference from non-normative evidence.   
Finally, type (iii) views—wherein the evidence for normative claims is the normative 
facts themselves—fare no better.  Of course, there may be explanatory relations between 
normative fact and normative fact.  If I thought that I was reliably latching on to the normative 
facts, then, there would be an explanatory connection between the contents of my judgments and 
the normative facts.  However, if we know there is no explanatory connection between my 
judgments and the normative facts, that I judge some normative proposition to be among my 
evidence provides no support at all for the claim that it is among my evidence.  While it is true 
on this view that our evidence does provide support for normative claims, it is not true on this 
view that we should trust ourselves to figure out what evidence we have.  A little more carefully, 
on this view Pr(p|I count normative proposition p as among my evidence) = Pr(p).  Thus, given 
the Trust Requirement, I cannot form justified beliefs that some normative proposition is among 
my evidence.    
Is there room for a naïve reply to these skeptical attacks?  We saw in the previous section 
that there is no room to deny that the evidential force of someone reaching a normative 
conclusion—either via apriori reasoning or via reasoning from non-normative premises—is 
undermined; that would constitute a Moorean response to motivated Academic skepticism.  
Perhaps, though, there is room to deny the Trust Requirement.  Consider our earlier naïve anti-
skeptical argument: 
 
Premise: (Cruelty-1) Evolution led us to judge that deliberate cruelty is wrong 
Premise: (Cruelty-2) Deliberate cruelty is wrong 
Therefore: (Cruelty-3) Evolution led us to correct normative judgments about cruelty. 
 
 
After conducting a bunch of reasoning along the lines of Cruelty 1-3 we might convince 
ourselves that our normative beliefs are trustworthy – after all, we keep getting things right!  Can 
this generate a standoff with a skeptic armed with the observation that our normative judgments 
lack evidential force and the Trust Requirement?   
No. We have seen that there is no room to claim that our normative judgments are 
evidence for normative propositions.  That claim, combined with the Trust Requirement, leads to 
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the conclusion that it is not reasonable to trust my normative judgments, including Cruelty-2.  If 
a non-skeptic accepts the Trust Requirement, the arguments against views of types (i)-(iii) are 
instances of motivated Academic skepticism.  Responding to such arguments by relying on the 
very claims whose support they undermine is no good: as we’ve seen, Moorean responses to 
academic skeptical arguments, if they work at all, work only against unmotivated Academic 
skepticism.  Any case against the Trust Requirement must not depend upon our ordinary 
normative judgments.  Naïve replies, such as Cruelty 1-3, won’t do. 
However, to any anti-skeptic who reasonably rejects the Trust Requirement—and whose 
grounds for doing so are independent of his ordinary normative judgments, such as Cruelty-2—
the skeptical arguments put forth against views of types (i) and (iii) are just unmotivated 
Academic skepticism.  The question, then, is whether there are such grounds for rejecting the 
Trust Requirement.  But it’s hard for me to see any such grounds: the Trust Requirement is a 
core truth about reasoning.  I doubt that anti-skeptics should take their stand here.  That is not to 
say that normative skepticism is inevitable: it is just to say that it is the inevitable result of 
accepting Explanatory Independence.   
  
4.7 WHO IS THE TARGET? (PART II) 
 
It is now time to consider who, exactly, can reject Explanatory Independence.  Explanatory 
Independence consists of three sub-theses: 
 
(1) Our normative judgments do not explain why the normative facts are what they are.  
 
(2) We do not have the particular normative faculties that we do because of the normative 
facts.   
 
(3) There is no third factor that explains both why we have the normative faculties that we do 
and why the normative facts are what they are.   
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One way to deny Explanatory Independence is to deny (1) and embrace constructivism: the 
view that our normative judgments constitutively explain why the normative facts are what they 
are.  Constructivism is a meta-normative view with a distinguished pedigree; I do not have 
anything novel to say about here, except to note that it can avoid the skeptical threat from 
Undermining 1-5.  A second way out is to deny (2) and say that the normative facts causally 
explain why we have the normative faculties that we do.  This strategy requires embracing two 
theses: first, naturalism or the view that normative facts are identical to natural facts (and thus 
causally efficacious);55 second, that normative facts are well-positioned to explain why we have 
the normative faculties that we do.   
So naturalists and constructivists can resist our skeptical argument, but only if they can 
endorse the claim that unmotivated Academic skeptical arguments fail – since, to foes of 
Explanatory Independence, Undermining 1-5 is an instance of unmotivated Academic 
skepticism.  That is, skeptics will reply to attempts to block Undermining 1-5 by embracing 
constructivism or naturalism by pointing out that your judgment that constructivism or 
naturalism is true is itself a normative judgment.  As a result, skeptics will insist, Undermining 1-
5 shows that you shouldn’t trust your judgment that constructivism or naturalism is true.  
Mooreans have no problem here, but philosophers who are less sanguine about Mooreanism have 
some explaining to do: how can we reject the skeptic’s undermining hypothesis without 
somehow “begging the question” against her?56  Since I’m happy with Moorean responses to 
skepticism, I’ll set this worry aside; non-Mooreans, though, are in trouble regardless of their 
meta-normative view.57 
 Naturalism and constructivism offer two ways out; is there a third, namely to reject (3) 
and insist on a common factor explanation of normative facts, on the one hand, and why we have 
the normative faculties that we do, on the other?  The only plausible candidates for the common 
                                                
55 I’ll ignore the possibility that normative facts might be non-natural and yet causally efficacious.   
56 Will it help to say that the judgment that either constructivism or naturalism is true isn’t a normative judgment but 
rather a meta-normative judgment, and thus isn’t called into doubt by Undermining 1-5?  No.  Skeptics can run a 
version of Undermining 1-5 that focuses on our faculties for meta-normative judgments (using the premise that there 
is no explanatory connection between the meta-normative facts and our faculties for making meta-normative 
judgments).   
57 One horn of the “Darwinian Dilemma” presented in Street (2006) amounts to saying that naturalists must embrace 
a Moorean response to (unmotivated) Academic skepticism.  
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factor are the natural “realizers” of normative facts.  Even those who deny that facts such as 
setting a cat on fire is wrong are causally efficacious can say first, that the act is wrong because 
it causes more pain than pleasure (say) and second, that we evolved a tendency to judge such 
actions wrong because they cause more pleasure than pain.  This sort of common factor 
explanation is amenable even to non-naturalistic realists, who deny the causal efficacy of 
normative facts. 58  This strategy requires two claims: first, that the normative facts are true 
because of certain natural facts; second those same natural facts are well suited to explain why 
we have the normative faculties that we do.  Can non-naturalistic realists make both those 
claims?   
They cannot.  A problem arises when we turn from particular normative claims—e.g. 
setting a cat on fire is wrong—to general normative principles, e.g. causing more pain than 
pleasure is wrong.  The common factor strategy stumbles in dealing with general normative 
principles in two ways.  First, natural facts can explain the wrongness of a particular act by 
showing that it is an instance of a more general kind of act (e.g. an act of causing more pain than 
pleasure)—and thereby showing that a general rule applies to it—but that sort of move cannot 
explain why the general rules are what they are (e.g. it cannot explain why causing more pain 
than pleasure is wrong).  But it’s hard to see any other explanatory strategies available to realists 
for using natural facts to explain normative facts; if there aren’t any, there is no way to use 
natural facts to explain why the general rules are what they are.  Second, general normative rules 
are necessary truths, so if there are natural truths that explain them, then there are natural truths 
that explain them in all worlds.  But what truths are these supposed to be?  I’m at a loss; I just 
can’t see any necessary natural facts that explain why causing more pain than pleasure is wrong.  
So the third approach doesn’t work: it leads to skepticism about general normative rules.  
One response to this difficulty is to deny that there are general normative rules, or that 
they play any important role in our normative reasoning.  This is a version of particularism, the 
view that there is no reason to suppose that there are true moral principles, where moral 
principles must be codifiable: not infinitely complex or applicable only to single cases. 59  The 
                                                
58 Enoch (forthcoming) defends a version of non-naturalistic realism on roughly these grounds.   
59 McKeever and Ridge (2006) distinguish between four versions of particularism; they call the version that I discuss 
here “Principle Skepticism Particularism” (15).  Dancy (2006) defends a stronger version of particularism: he denies 
that there are moral principles (as opposed to denying that we ought to expect, in advance of doing normative ethics, 
to find any).   
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good news is that particularists can shrug off skepticism about normative generalities.  The bad 
news is that particularism entails that neither the normative facts nor their naturalistic realizers 
can explain why we have the normative faculties that we do.  We can explain why creatures 
inclined to judge actions conducive to total happiness, or the preservation of human life, or 
whatever would be more likely to survive; we could not do so for an inclination to believe in a 
shapeless or non-codifiable set of facts.60  Returning to the example of cat immolation: it is 
plausible that we evolved the normative faculties that we did because judging that actions that 
cause more pain than pleasure are wrong has some survival value; if the fact that the action 
causes more pleasure than pain just is the wrongness of setting the cat on fire then the normative 
facts explain our normative judgments.  It is not plausible, however, that we evolved the 
normative faculties that we did because judging that actions with the highly specific and local set 
of features borne by this instance of cat-immolation are wrong: it is vanishingly unlikely that any 
of my ancestors ever encountered an action with those features.  None of this is to say that there 
must be a single true moral principle, or that the principles need to be as simple as actions that 
cause more pain than pleasure are always wrong; the point is just that the principles must be 
general enough that a tendency to judge in accordance with them could have survival value.61   
In sum, then, non-naturalistic realists face a dilemma: do general normative principles 
play an important role in our reasoning?  If yes, they are in trouble because there is no 
explanatory connection between normative generalities and our attitudes.  If no, they are in 
trouble because non-codifiable normative principles are ill-suited to explain why we have the 
attitudes that we do.  Neither answer is consistent with rejecting Explanatory Independence by 
rejecting (3). 
 
                                                
60 One thesis that sometimes goes by the name “particularism” is that we should only expect to find moral principles 
involving “thick” normative terms such as cruelty or cowardice – we should not expect to find moral principles 
statable using only normatively neutral language.  I do not mean for what I have said here to be an attack on this 
thesis.  One difficulty in arguing against this weaker version of particularism is that “thick” moral terms tend to be 
psychological terms, and determining the relationship between the psychological and the natural is—to put it 
mildly—beyond the scope of this paper.   
61 I’ve stated particularism as a thesis about moral principles.  Fans of particularism about epistemology would also 
be unable to reject Explanatory Independence, but as far as I know epistemic particularism has no adherents (it’s 
interesting to ask why not, though I confess that I am at a loss to explain the asymmetry).   
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4.8 CONCLUSION: AUSTERITY WITHOUT EMPIRICISM 
 
In this chapter I have reached three conclusions.  First, I have argued that the best version 
of the worry about the causal origins of our normative judgments—Undermining 1-5—is a rare 
and powerful type of skeptical argument.  It is more effective than Coincidence 1-5 because it 
does not just raise a puzzle about our normative judgments but rather undermines their support.  
It is more effective than standard Academic skeptical arguments because it gives motivation for 
its undermining hypothesis – and, crucially, fans of Explanatory Independence accept the 
premises of this argument.  Undermining 1-5 is thus a rare and devastating breed: a motivated 
Academic skeptical argument.   
Second, I have argued that adopting an alternative epistemology of the normative—a 
view of type (i)-(iii) wherein the output of our faculties is not evidence for normative 
conclusions—cannot defeat skepticism.  A skeptic armed with the Trust Requirement can make 
trouble for alternative approaches to normative epistemology.  
Third, I have suggested a way out: insist on explanatory relations between normative 
facts and our faculties of normative judgment. We can do this by adopting constructivism and 
saying the normative facts are what they are because we are inclined to make certain judgments, 
or by adopting naturalism and identifying normative facts with some of the natural facts that 
explain how we came to have our normative faculties.  Against these positions, Undermining 1-5 
is a form of unmotivated Academic skepticism.  If we do insist on explanatory relations between 
normative facts and our normative faculties, we must reject both particularism and non-
naturalistic realism. 
If we step back far enough, the argument of this paper resembles a familiar sort 
philosophical worry: how can we know about “invisible” facts - about norms, or modal 
properties, or abstract objects?  We can’t, after all, learn about them by perceiving them, or by 
talking to people who perceived them, or building instruments to measure them.  Philosophers 
have tried to make this sort of worry precise in many ways: through the empiricist account of 
concept formation (i.e. the “copy principle”), verificationism, the causal theory of knowledge, 
and Harman’s explanatory relevance test.  These attempts are all versions of empiricism, giving 
pride of place to experience.  This means that whether or not we can defeat these arguments on 
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their own terms—accusing them of having outlandish implications, say, or of being self-
defeating—there is always room to resist them by just denying empiricism.  This can shut down 
the familiar arguments against “invisible” facts: though empiricism’s emphasis on experience is 
pretty plausible, it’s difficult to really argue for the copy principle, or verificationism, or the 
causal theory of knowledge, or the explanatory relevance test.  Hume, Ayer, Benacerraf, and 
Harman—to cite perhaps the most prominent proponents of the aforementioned strategies—just 
announce these principles; they don’t argue for them.62  While my argument against a kind of 
“invisible” fact—normative facts, understood along non-naturalistic realist lines—shares an aim 
with these earlier attempts, it doesn’t share their empiricism.  Nowhere do I insist on experience 
as a royal road to justification.  Rejecting empiricism leaves my argument untouched.   
That doesn’t mean I make no assumptions – just that I make different ones. My argument 
doesn’t give pride of place to experience, but rather gives it to inference to the best explanation.  
The thought that inference to the best explanation is always rational is the key premise in my 
argument for the Explanatory Constraint.  While jettisoning inference to the best explanation 
entirely is surely too radical, perhaps one can restrict its applicability; I suspect that this is the 
best line of resistance to the argument of this paper.  The alternative picture rejects the 
application of the Explanatory Constraint to the normative domain (which, in turn, requires 
rejecting that inference to the best explanation is always rational in the normative domain).  On 
this alternative picture there is no reason to conclude, from the lack of explanatory connection 
between the normative facts and the output of our faculties, that the evidential force of the output 
of our faculties is undermined.  This alternative would still take some philosophical work: for 
one thing, we would need an alternative picture of evidential support wherein the output of 
normative faculties is evidence for normative claims.  All told, I do not accept this alternative: 
I’d need a compelling positive story about how it is that our normative judgments are evidence 
for normative claims.  But this alternative position is tempting nonetheless, so there is another 
way out.    
 
 
 
                                                
62 See Hume (2000), Ayer (1952), Benacerraf (1973), and Harman (1989).   
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